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The Incident Command System (ICS) was originally adopted in the 1970s as a 
fire service emergency management system. Following the events on September 11, 
2001, the National Response Plan adopted ICS across all hazards and disciplines in order 
to unite responders under the same management system during emergencies. However, 
creating one system to service so many disparate agencies and response types was a 
massive undertaking, and the system’s effectiveness has since been questioned. 
To operate in ICS, responders must engage in the adult learning process, which 
requires social interaction with an engaged instructor and active peers. Before the system 
can be judged properly, we must ensure personnel have been trained and are 
implementing the system adequately.   
This thesis examines the adult learning process and the keys to ensuring that 
learning and behavior change actually occur. It further examines ICS courses’ current 
online delivery system and recommends evaluating this system to engage the social 
learning required for successful cultural change. The thesis also critiques the ICS training 
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The Incident Command System (ICS) was designed in the 1970s to handle large-
scale incidents, with its first incarnation developed to battle wildfires in California. The 
National Wildland Coordinating Group remains a staunch example of the system’s ability 
to effectively handle large-scale incidents. The Phoenix Fire Department saw the 
advantages of ICS and modified ICS to be used on smaller-scale incidents in a program 
known as Fire Command.  
After 9/11, presidential executive orders created the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), which incorporated ICS as one of its key components. The 
intent was to unite all responders under a single command system that has been proven 
effective, and to modify the system to handle all large-scale or complex disasters. Over a 
decade after President George W. Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
declared NIMS and ICS as the unifying programs for incident management, there 
remains debate over how ICS should be implemented and if it is, indeed, the all-hazard 
management system it is purported to be. Before the system’s effectiveness can be 
judged, however,, we must first determine if responders understand the system and are 
implementing it properly. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and law enforcement respond to and 
mitigate emergencies across this nation daily in a quick and efficient manner. However, 
they may encounter incidents that exceed their normal scope of practice and will require 
coordination across different agencies and disciplines. The ICS system is intended to 
cover the entire response process, from the initial incident until ultimate its resolution. 
When initial incident leaders are tasked with managing an incident they may not have the 
resources to address, they are expected to begin incident command as best as they can 
until higher-level units arrive. There is confusion, however, about which ICS steps and 
components should be implemented at the early stages, and how they should be 
implemented. First responders find it difficult to understand the ICS system and the role 
 xvi 
they play within it, particularly during chaotic incidents. But why is this occurring? 
Furthermore, if we can identify the root cause of this issue, can we identify strategies to 
correct it? 
B. ANALYSIS 
This thesis considers why responders need a common emergency management 
system and why some organizations and key personnel are struggling to understand, 
accept, and implement these systems. To do so, the research examines the adult education 
mechanisms and the elements necessary for learning as well as behavioral and cultural 
change. By evaluating the current measurement methods in place for NIMS/ICS, the 
thesis questions if the level and method of training currently offered in ICS are achieving 
their compliance goal. The research further explores the social element necessary for 
adult education and analyzes if ICS’ current online delivery training platform is engaging 
this crucial element. It also considers the measurements of success utilized to see if 
training goals are met.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the evidence collected, this thesis makes the following 
recommendations: 
• The nation has determined that the overall incident management structure 
for all responses will be ICS, and emergency responders must understand 
the commitment they have made to their agency, local populace, and the 
nation to understand and operate in this system. This means more than 
simply achieving a certificate and NIMS compliance on paper—training 
must help responders understand how they fit into the ICS system.   
• NIMS/ICS must continue to recognize and maintain its flexibility to be 
considered a viable tool for all-discipline and all-hazard responses. 
• In order to be effective, the training must incorporate the social interaction 
critical to adult learning and referenced in the ICS training guidance. The 
current static online courses do not engage peer collaboration. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should give serious 
consideration to reevaluating the delivery methods of these courses and 
adjusting the format to create dynamic environments that engage live 
instructors and peer interaction.   
 xvii 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
In a nation with such diverse governmental and non-governmental resources, 
getting every responder on the same page is an ambitious goal. For ICS to remain viable 
for all responders to address all hazards, it has to remain a flexible tool that all 
stakeholders understand and can efficiently incorporate. Emergency responders must 
make the commitment to take the appropriate training and understand the tool effectively, 
which may require significant time and dedication to advanced ICS training and 
certification.  
Furthermore, the training must incorporate key elements necessary for adult 
learning and engage the learners in a collaborative environment, even if completed in an 
online platform. More dynamic measures of student learning and system implementation 
must be incorporated to better understand and affect the necessary system changes. The 
training should be evaluated and updated as a result of these observations. 
There is value in ICS, but only if all responders understand the system and their 
role in the system. The first step in achieving this level of cohesion is an effective 
training program. This thesis attempts to provide guidance to restructure the current 
training program in order to build a more effective delivery platform.   
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On September 11, 2001, America felt its vulnerability even to threats that 
gather on the other side of the Earth. We resolved then, and we are 
resolved today, to confront every threat from any source that could bring 
sudden terror and suffering to America. 
—George W. Bush 
 
A. A PREPARED NATION AND THE ADOPTION OF NIMS/ICS 
One of the earliest documents supporting the construct of the United States’ 
emergency preparedness was Section 602 of the Stafford Act, which defines preparedness 
as “activities and measures designed or undertaken … to deal with the immediate 
conditions which would be created by the hazard.”1 In his 2011 Presidential Policy 
Directive 8, President Barack Obama stated that “our national preparedness is the shared 
responsibility of all levels of government. … Everyone can contribute to safeguarding the 
Nation from harm.”2 Together, these two historic documents indicate that achieving and 
maintaining a prepared nation involves all levels of government and includes all 
stakeholders working together in a common effort to plan, respond to, and mitigate all 
disastrous events in an orderly fashion. This concept of all levels of government working 
together within a common system is the basis of the original National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) framework, which guides all stakeholders “to work 
together seamlessly and manage incidents involving all threats and hazards.”3 
“Preparedness,” it further declares, “is a continuous process.”4  
                                                 
1 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 3-288, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. 5121 et seq.  
2 “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness,” Department of Homeland Security, 
last modified September 23, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-
preparedness. 
3 “The National Incident Management System,” FEMA, accessed August 18, 2015, 
http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system.  
4 Ibid.  
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What role do all the stakeholders play in achieving this definition, and how is its 
success measured? More importantly, what role do the key programs play in achieving 
this goal? At the heart of these programs are NIMS and the Incident Command System 
(ICS). Over a decade after President George Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 declared NIMS and ICS as the unifying programs for incident management, 
there remains debate about how ICS should be implemented and if it is, indeed, the all-
hazard management system it is purported to be.5 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was formed as the lead agency for homeland security at the federal 
level.6 Immediately, questions arose regarding the true level of responsibility given to 
this agency.7 The roles different levels of government play in homeland security 
activities change depending on the nature and location of the incident. Even with 
significant events on American soil, it is most likely not DHS’ primary responsibility to 
play the lead agency. Outlined within its own training program, NIMS guidance clearly 
indicates: “A basic premise of NIMS is that all incidents begin and end locally.”8 The 
RAND Corporation echoed these comments in testimony to Congress outlining the 
critical role first responders at the local level play in responding to and ultimately 
mitigating large-scale events.9   
Existing guidance documents recognize that not only are first responders truly the 
first on the scene, they are also in a unique position to understand the individual 
characteristics of the areas affected and the response and resources available and needed 
                                                 
5 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5,” Department of Homeland Security, February 28, 
2003, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-presidential-directive-5#. 
6 “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” Department of Homeland Security, last 
modified September 24, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
7 Thomas Goss, “‘Who’s in Charge?’ New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Security,” Homeland 
Security Affairs II, no. 1 (2006). 
8 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System Training Program 
(Washington, DC: FEMA, 2011), 2. 
9 Applying Lessons Learned from Past Response Operations to Strengthening National Preparedness, 
House Homeland Security Committee (testimony of Brian A. Jackson, presented on behalf of RAND 
Corporation, June 18, 2014).  
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for ultimate resolution.10 An attempt by the federal government (or any one agency) to 
provide a single-source solution for every incident in every locale would present a very 
complicated problem. The responsibility of the federal government should remain to 
build a national response system that effectively supports first responders’ efforts, but 
that does so within a flexible framework that guides efforts—not within a rigid set of 
rules that ignores diversity.11 A large portion of the responsibility for incident resolution 
remains with the local responders, with support from the federal government.12   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In an effort to determine if ICS is executing its current strategy to achieve 
preparedness and organized response, this thesis examines the following issues.   
(1) Do first responders find it difficult to implement and understand ICS 
during the first operational period? 
This study focuses on incidents that exceed local responders’ resources and 
capabilities, specifically during the first operational period. The first tactical operations 
begin when the first resources arrive on scene and mitigation begins.13 To ultimately 
resolve the incident, local responders may need to employ other levels of government and 
responders from other agencies and disciplines.14 The NIMS/ICS goal is it to create and 
maintain an organized structure from incident initiation through incident termination and 
recovery on a nationally taught and recognized platform.15 The first concern of this study 
was to determine if the goal of creating a universally used and understood management 
system is occurring as desired and intended.  
                                                 
10 Ibid.   
11 Jackson, Applying Lessons Learned, 6. 
12 Ibid. 
13 FEMA, ICS-400: Advanced ICS for Command and General Staff, Student Manual (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 2.21. 
14 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System,” (National 
Engagement Draft posted May 2016), 10–11. 
15 Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Training Program, 1–2. 
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(2) If first responders are struggling to implement ICS properly during 
the first operational period, why is this occurring? 
ICS was designed to give first responders a structured system to organize 
response during large or complex incidents.16 Cognitive research indicates that, when 
faced with complex tasks, the executive portion of the brain can only process two to three 
tasks effectively at a time.17 Situational limited cognitive abilities underscore the need for 
emergency responders to adopt and train in pre-organized systems, such as ICS, to help 
personnel manage their tasks efficiently in stressful situations. 
NIMS compliance requires first responders to take ICS training.18 Depending on 
responder’s rank and responsibilities, he or she is advised to take 100-level basic ICS at 
minimum to 400-level advanced ICS at maximum.19 Advanced practitioners will take 
position-specific courses, which can last for sixteen to forty hours just to train for one 
specific position within the ICS system.20 The goal of these training programs is to 
prepare responders to implement and escalate ICS as needed throughout the incident.21 
Training in ICS is part of the equation, but it is only one component of the overall 
system. ICS is the tool utilized to organize the team, but they tool must be understood and 
applied properly in order to work.22 This thesis considers several reasons why ICS is not 
being implemented, including lack of organizational acceptance, confusion in training 
implementation, failure of the training itself, improper system implementation, and 
inappropriateness of the system itself.   
                                                 
16 FEMA, United States Fire Administration (USFA), and National Fire Academy (NFA), Incident 
Command System: Student Manual (Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999), 1.3–5.    
17 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking Penguin, 
2002), 178–179 
18 Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Training Program, 1–2. 
19 Ibid., 17–18. 
20 Ibid., 43–57. 
21 Ibid., 1–2. 
22 FEMA, Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS-100): Instructor Guide (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
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(3) If we can identify the root cause of this issue, can we identify 
strategies to correct it?  
Does the solution involve correcting the system, updating the training curriculum, 
identifying sources of agency adoption, or identifying another system—other than ICS—
for incident management? Does the solution differ for large agencies that are flush with 
resources than for smaller or rural agencies that operate with limited resources?  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and law enforcement respond to and 
mitigate emergencies across this nation daily in a quick and efficient manner. However, 
they may encounter incidents that exceed their normal scope of practice and initial 
conditions may be chaotic.23 The incident can be an act of violence, a natural disaster 
such as a flood or tornado, or a man-made disaster such as a derailment or chemical spill. 
One officer, crew, or department cannot fix these problems alone or by regular 
methods.24 They require coordination across different agencies and disciplines. 
Moreover, complete incident resolution and recovery cannot, and will not, be achieved in 
less than twenty-four hours.   
The ICS system is intended to cover the entire response process, from the initial 
incident until its resolution.25 Initial units are meant to arrive, begin mitigation, and 
organize the event under the ICS construct.26 If the incident exceeds the initial 
responders’ scope, the initial incident managers bring additional help (all the way to the 
federal level) until the incident is stabilized.27 The courses teach that, as the incident 
escalates in size and complexity, ICS should be subsequently expanded.28   
                                                 
23 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh: Review 
Package,” (working draft) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 2016), 1. 
24 Ibid., 16; Edward Deverell, “Investigating the Roots of Crisis Management Studies and Outlining 
Future Trajectories for the Field,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 9, no. 1 
(2012): 4. 
25 FEMA, Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS-100), 3.6–7. 
26 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh,” 10–14. 
27 FEMA, ICS-400 Student Manual, 3.3. 
28 FEMA, ICS for Single Resource and Initial Action Incidents (ICS-200): Instructor Guide 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 2.37. 
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In some events (such as tornados), however, the incident is not going to expand in 
size. When initial responders first arrive at the scene, the incident is already at the 
catastrophic level and it will not gradually escalate. The initial incident leaders could be 
tasked with managing an incident they do not have the resources to address. They are 
expected to begin incident command as best as they can until higher-level units arrive.29 
During these responses it is key for incident commanders to gradually expand their 
incident management structure in an organized manner as resources become available.30 
Is it understood what steps and components of ICS should be implemented at this stage of 
the incident and how they should be implemented? And is this occurring? 
Large-scale, chaotic incidents rely upon mutual aid units from other departments, 
cities, counties, regions, and perhaps even states.31 It is for this reason that NIMS and 
ICS was created—when these resources arrive, they all operate under one common 
framework.32 But does this framework efficiently achieve its desired goal? Is it 
understood by all responders of all disciplines? And is it appropriate for all response 
scenarios? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
While ICS has seen some success in emergency response, there still remains 
confusion and resistance, particularly from disciplines outside the fire service, where ICS 
originated. To determine the cause, root cause analysis was used as the research design 
for this thesis. The five analysis steps are introduced in this section 
1. Define the Problem 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 5 required all emergency 
response agencies to adopt NIMS.33 The M in NIMS stands for management; one of 
NIMS’ critical components is that emergency service leaders must adopt ICS as their 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 7.5. 
30 Ibid., 2.39–40. 
31 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh,” 10–11. 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5,” Department of Homeland Security. 
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management system.34 The result was the rapid development of the Emergency 
Management Institute (EMI) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ICS 
training system, which included training through ICS 100 and 200 online, and ICS 300 
and 400 in regional classrooms.35 These courses were designed to prepare local and 
regional responders for incidents at the local level until resolution or the arrival of an 
incident management team.36 Now, a decade after these initial NIMS-compliant ICS 
trainings were implemented, there are officially adopted courses for upper-level ICS 
training.37 Although ICS should be more refined and widely accepted now that it has 
matured and advanced, there still remain several opponents and supporting literature that 
argues ICS has not been proven effective, and therefore has not been accepted as a 
successful and appropriate system.38 This thesis systematically analyzes why universal 
acceptance of ICS is not occurring.  
2. Collect Data 
To collect data, the researcher reviewed literature, closely examined both the 
historic ICS training curriculum and current NIMS ICS training, and analyzed results 
from NIMS integration center’s open comment period.   
In order to observe the nature and scope of the problem, the literature review 
began with two previously published Naval Postgraduate School theses that specifically 
address ICS shortcomings during the initial operational period. Cynthia Renaud, 
commander of the Long Beach Police Department, examined the initial response to the 9/
11 terrorist attack at the Pentagon by affected military personnel, and noted that 
responders’ actions did not correspond to the roles identified in the ICS command and 
general staff positions.39 Although the response did not lead to overall incident 
                                                 
34 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh,” 3. 
35 Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Training Program, 2. 
36 Ibid., 7. 
37 Ibid., 43–57. 
38 Sean Hildebrand, “Coerced Confusion? Local Emergency Policy Implementation after September 
11,” Homeland Security and Emergency Management 12, no. 2 (2015): 273–298.  
39 Cynthia Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial Response 
Efforts to Large-Scale Incidents,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 79–91. 
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resolution, the responders’ actions were critical to the mission; they saved many lives and 
contributed positively to overall incident management.40 Renaud explains:  
Newly assigned to the Pentagon, Navy SEAL Craig Powell also acted to 
save many lives that day. In one situation, he saw men attempting to build 
a makeshift staircase so people trapped on the floors above could climb 
out the windows down to safety. Quickly assessing the situation, he 
realized there were not enough pieces of furniture to build any kind of 
structure and the fire was quickly advancing in the room above them. … 
Powell told all the men on the floor to form a human net and then told the 
people above to jump into the waiting net. … When Lieutenant General 
P.K. Carlton arrived on scene … Carlton immediately followed Powell 
and began to help him.41  
Assistant Sheriff of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Theodore Moody’s 
thesis also examined ICS shortcomings. While Moody did not specifically address the 
first operational period, he did address ICS’ overall inappropriateness for law 
enforcement application during large chaotic incidents, particularly active shooter 
responses. His analysis of the attack in Mumbai, India, echo Renaud’s arguments that 
individuals in highly charged environments are more effective when performing their 
standard jobs tasks—as trained to do on a routine basis—as opposed to attempting to 
implement the ICS system, which they may have limited exposure to on a regular basis.42 
The common thread between Moody and Renaud’s theses are the actions of first 
responders during chaotic incidents; both argue that ICS is not applicable in these 
situations. 
District Chief Andrew Teeter of the Tulsa Fire Department also contributes 
research to the issues surrounding perceived ICS system challenges.43 His argument is 
not against ICS, but rather focuses on the complications that occurred when NIMS 
mandated that ICS—a formerly fire service–specific tool—be adopted across all response 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 91. 
41 Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos,” 81. 
42 Theodore, J. Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial 
Response in the Age of the Urban Jihad,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
43 Andrew C. Teeter, “On a Clear Day, You Can See ICS: The Dying Art of Incident Command and 
the Normal Accident of NIMS—A Policy Analysis,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
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disciplines.44 Teeter’s research ultimately recommends that ICS should be organized only 
in a “bottom-up” configuration, not “top-down.”45 Renaud, Moody, and Teeter all 
present valid concerns about the current ICS system and articulate the need for further 
investigation. 
Also important to the data collection is a close review of the available ICS 
training curricula. These curricula range from the introductory ICS course to advanced-
level classes that are required for NIMS compliance, discipline-specific training that 
exceeds basic ICS training, and position-specific training directed at advanced ICS 
practitioners who serve on an incident management team (IMT).46 Curricula are 
evaluated for intended goals and observed results, and closely examined for discrepancies 
or contradictions.   
3. Possible Causal Factors 
Several possible causal factors are considered for this study: 
• Were Moody and Renaud correct in their assertions that ICS is not an 
appropriate system for all applications and responses? 
• As Moody argues, has the ICS system become too complex and 
overcomplicated? 
• Is the ICS training curriculum itself appropriate? 
• Have the ICS training goals been realized?     
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., introduction. 
45 Ibid., 80, 83–85. 
46 “IS-100.B: Introduction to Incident Command System, ICS-100,” FEMA, accessed November 5, 
2015, http://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-100.b; FEMA, ICS-400 Student Manual, 
3.3; “Incident Management Team Professional Development and Training,” U.S. Fire Administration 
(USFA), accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.usfa.fema.gov/training/imt; “NFA Course Catalog,” 
USFA, accessed September 19, 2016, https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/nfacourses/catalog/search?onCampus 
Long=true&courseCurricula=9&forget=true; “NIMS ICS All-Hazards Position Specific Training Program 
Official website,” FEMA, accessed August 15, 2016, https://training.fema.gov/allhazards/. 
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4. The Likely Root Cause 
The possible causal factor was determined by applying the “5 Whys” technique. 
This technique was developed by Sakichi Toyoda during the 1930s to gain an in-depth 
understanding of a problem and determine its root cause.47 For this thesis, the process 
began by questioning why there is a need or desire for one incident management system. 
It then drilled down to determine why the system is failing in some circumstances.  
5. Recommend Solutions or Corrective Action 
Once the root cause is identified, it is then possible to develop a course of 
corrective action. In order to address the diverse and complex nature of the American 
emergency response, ICS has become a complex system. The findings in this thesis are 
multi-layered and, in turn, led to multi-layered recommendations regarding first 
responders’ responsibility to understand and implement the ICS system. It also 
recommends a close examination of how the ICS training is implemented and how it can 
be improved, including improvements to the measuring system that gauges ICS adoption 
and implementation. 
                                                 
47 “5 Whys: Getting to the Root of a Problem Quickly,” MindTools, accessed July 27, 2016, 
https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_5W.htm. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Leadership and management are complex studies and practices.48 This is no truer 
than when managers must lead in times of extreme disorder and constantly evolving 
changes. Controlling chaotic change is critically important “in dynamic systems, ones 
which change over time, [because] the constant feeding back of changes throughout the 
system means that the tiniest change in how things start often become hugely magnified 
over time.”49 The result is a large field of study into chaos and complexity theory, which 
is significantly more relevant as the world we live in becomes increasingly connected, 
interactive, and fast paced.50 Finding new solutions to arising threats and getting 
organizations to adopt new techniques has been problematic; there are “constant 
reminders that old ideas are difficult to dislodge even in light of wicked problems” and 
“decisions made by individuals in organizations are influenced by the values and culture 
an organization practices.”51 
A. TRADITIONAL METHOD FAILURES IN DYNAMIC SITUATIONS 
In attempts to find solutions, standard practice may be to examine other 
successful methods, evaluate their strengths, and then attempt to employ them as useful 
solutions to the problem.52 Unfortunately, emulating other programs may not be practical 
in today’s environment. 
Our paradigm has been that to forecast you need to measure, to plan and 
then to control and it used to work. It used to be the right thing to do in a 
steady, predictable world, but that’s not today. Today we live in a critical 
                                                 
48 Alexander M. Goulielmos, “Complexity theory: a science where historical accidents matter,” 
Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 14, Number 4, (2005): 537. 
49 Jonathan Wilson, “Winning through Chaos,” Credit Control 20, no. 4, (1999): 28. 
50 Ibid., 29. 
51 Heather Davis, “Social Complexity Theory for Sense Seeking: Unearthing Leadership Mindsets for 
Unknowable and Uncertain Times,” Emergence: Complexity and Organization 17, no. 1 (March 2015), 1–
20; Kenneth Goldberg, “Mitigating Unintended Consequences during Crises: Improving the Decision-
Making Process,” Journal of Behavioral Studies in Business 25, no. 2 (2013): 2. 
52 Philip Anderson, “Perspective: Complexity Theory and Organizational Science,” Organizational 
Science 10, no. 3, (1999): 226, doi: 10.1287/orsc.10.3.216. 
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state of unpredictability. You cannot measure accurately enough to 
forecast meaningfully.53  
Changing the dynamic is not easy in traditionally hierarchal organizations, and 
“shifting the focus to strategic thinking requires a considerable change in culture.”54 
Understanding the “underlying assumptions (values and shared vision) of an 
organization” is important to understanding that organization’s decision-making during a 
crisis.55 There is also concern with allowing agencies the freedom to pursue opportunities 
while balancing responsibilities and limiting risk.56 However, these concerns do not 
excuse leaders from pursuing some course of action.   
What we need, therefore, are ways of dealing with that which we cannot 
calculate, of coping with our ignorance. There is a name for this. It is 
called “ethics” and no amount of complexity theory will allow us to 
escape it.57 
Management must shift from a platform of reserved planning to a system that allows 
agencies to act and react.58   
In environments far from equilibrium, where cascades of change are 
constantly playing out and overlapping with one another, adaption must be 
evolved, not planned. Adaption is the passage of an organization through 
an endless series of organizational microstates that emerge from local 
interactions among agents trying to improve their local payoffs.59 
In order to understand decisions made during crisis, we must study organizational 
systems and how they react to internal and external forces.60 To do so, we must combine 
traditional models and develop new models for organizations to utilize during 
                                                 
53 Wilson, “Winning through Chaos,” 30. 
54 Davis, “Social Complexity Theory.”  
55 Goldberg, “Mitigating Unintended Consequences,” 3. 
56 Rob Preston, “Manage Risk, but Don’t Become Paralyzed by it,” Information Week, no. 1152, 
(2007): 84. 
57 Paul Cilliers, “Complexity, Deconstruction, and Relativism,” Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 5, 
(October 2005): 83, doi: 10.1177/026327640508052.  
58 Davis, “Social Complexity Theory.”  
59 Anderson, “Perspective,” 228. 
60 Goldberg, “Mitigating Unintended Consequences,” 2. 
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emergencies.61 Organizations must also find ways to actively engage their personnel, as 
participation is directly related to overcoming resistance to change.62 
B. NEW MANAGEMENT IDEAS 
In a desire to “move from planning to learning and imagining,” it has been found 
that “single business units achieve rapid evolutionary progress through improvisational 
moves based upon a few rules, responsibilities, goals, and measures.”63 Flexible systems 
are desired that allow for freedom to operate; “too much control represses 
possibilities.”64 Problems can have more than one solution and unpredictable 
outcomes.65 There may not be one clear way to reach the outcome and independent 
thought may become as important as traditional teamwork. 
When there is not a single optimum, one may wish to encourage search 
behavior. This can be accomplished by making actors more interdependent 
with one another in search of a common goal—for example, by forming 
them into cross-functional team or requiring tighter synchronization 
among their actions.66 
As a result of uncertain environments, new management models shift from the 
traditional model of ample preparation to a model in which some planning is conducted, 
but then quick action is needed.67 Afterward, the actions are examined and refined to 
determine a better course.68 Leadership and management on the front lines may require 
creative deviance; after all, “progress often demands new ideas and innovation.”69 This 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr., Human Relations (New York: Plenum Publishing Company, 
1948) 512–532, as it appears in Walter E. Natemeyer and J. Timothy McMahon, Classics of Organizational 
Behavior, 3rd Edition (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2001), 427. 
63 Wilson, “Winning through Chaos,” 32; Anderson, “Perspective,” 228. 
64 Wilson, “Winning through Chaos,” 27. 
65 Goulielmos, “Complexity Theory,” 537. 
66 Philip Anderson et al., “Introduction to the Special Issue: Applications of Complexity Theory to 
Organizational Science,” Organizational Science 10, no. 3, (1999): 234. 
67 Davis, “Social Complexity Theory.” 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ronald A. Heifetz, Leadership without Easy Answers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994), 187. 
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style of leadership will likely require a completely different architecture than traditional 
models.   
The new management logic also requires internal processes that facilitate 
all kinds of emergent processes as self-generated sources of dissipative 
energy, such as improvisation, product champions, and emergent 
strategies. In addition, the new management logic requires openness to 
bottom-up processes and acceptance of effective equifinal outcomes. 
Finally, the new management logic also requires leadership styles that 
moderate dysfunctional tension and forestall the emergence of chaos.70 
Understanding and reorganizing operational systems is a balancing act; the system 
must uphold organization cultures and values, remain transparent and culpable to the 
stakeholders, and minimize unintended consequences while maximizing results.71 Classic 
leadership responsibility is to find this balance and establish effective goals for the 
organization.72 Then, leaders have the obligation to provide all the tools their personnel 
need to exceed.73   
C. ADULT LEARNING 
If designing and restructuring management and leadership models sounds 
daunting, it is even more daunting to train leaders, managers, and stakeholders to 
understand and operate in these systems.74 To do so, the training must be ongoing and as 
dynamic as the systems themselves.75 
In times marked by complexity, turbulence and epochal shifts, alternative 
sense seeking models and languages that encourage rapprochement of 
economic, environmental and human sustainability are necessary. In this 
                                                 
70 Arie Y. Lewin, “Application of Complexity Theory to Organizational Science,” Organizational 
Science 10, no. 3, (1999): 215, doi: 10.1287/orsc.10.3.215. 
71 Goldberg, “Mitigating Unintended Consequences,” 4. 
72 Heifetz, Leadership without Easy Answers, 22. 
73 Pete Luongo, 10 Truths about Leadership…it’s Not Just about Winning (Covington, KY: Clerisy 
Press, 2007), 55. 
74 Richard Baldwin, “Training for the Management of Major Emergencies,” Disaster Prevention 
Management: An International Journal 3, no. 1, (1994): 18–23.  
75 Davis, “Social Complexity Theory.” 
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regard learning, unlearning, and relearning become key components for 
this intentional work.76 
Many adult education goals aim to equip learners with the tools to critically evaluate and 
reflect upon their surroundings and to empower them to transform their surroundings.77 
Several roadblocks inhibit adult learning goals.78 Among these is the learner’s 
desire to know the reason why learning is occurring, student ego and hubris, the learner’s 
apprehension to material from unknown or untrusted sources, and unclear objectives.79 
Equally important to achieving adult learning goals is holding the learners accountable 
for learning, removing workplace distractions, and involving coaching and feedback.80 
Dialogue and reflection are important components of adult learning, but it is also 
important to keep the agency or individual’s regional, local, or organizational culture in 
mind.81 “Unlike other influences, the impact of culture is always ingrained and indirect, 
and will take a longer time to modify or change.”82 
Research has shown that equally critical components of adult learning are the 
social learning environment and interactions, and a basic understanding of the simple 
concept mechanics.83 Interaction aids critical reflection, which “is an essential process 
for new learning that takes an experience or experiences as its starting point. These 
experiences are imbued with emotion.”84 MRI imaging reveals that the portion of the 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 8. 
77 Rachel Percy, “The Contribution of Transformative Learning Theory to the Practice of Participatory 
Research and Extension: Theoretical Reflections,” Agriculture and Human Values 22 (2005): 127, doi: 
10.1007/s10460-004-8273-1. 
78 Clinton Longenecker and Rob Abernathy, “The Eight Imperatives of Effective Adult Learning: 
Designing, Implementing and Assessing Experiences in the Modern Workplace,” Human Resource 
Management International Digest 21, no. 7 (2013): 31, doi: 10.1108/HRMID-10-2013-0090. 
79 Ibid., 31–32.  
80 Ibid., 32.  
81 Percy, “The Contribution of Transformative Learning,” 129. 
82 Wu Bing and Teoh Ai Ping, “A Comparative Analysis of Learners Interaction in the Online 
Learning Management Systems: Does National Culture Matter?” Asian Association of Open Universities 
Journal 3, no. 1 (2008): 13. 
83 Nicholas Clarke, “Emotional Intelligence and Learning in Teams,” Journal of Workplace Learning 
22, no. 3, (2010): 127, doi: 10.1108/13665621011028594. 
84 Ibid., 135. 
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human brain responsible for reactions can “undergo emotional learning to stimuli that are 
never experienced.”85 In order to challenge previously held assumptions and realize 
transformative learning, deeper, more meaningful emotional conflict must be experienced 
and resolved as part of the learning process.86 Social interaction has the most powerful 
impact when trying to change individual behavior and adopt new behaviors.87  
Learning in groups is a critical component to this process. Rather than simply 
reviewing content, the student must engage with his instructors and peers.88 First, it is 
necessary to observe how individuals interact with team members—the degree of 
relational ties between team members directly influences quality of knowledge 
exchange.89 This interaction may not always be positive for the learner; in fact, negative 
team experiences often lead to deeper, behavior-changing learning.90 Emotional 
awareness is also important for “problem analysis, theorizing cause and affect 
relationships, and action planning.”91 Training emergency responders to deal with 
disasters heightens the need to observe and understand emotional states.92   
Training for major emergencies takes on a new dimension. Not only do 
personnel have to be trained in the plans and the procedures that are 
developed for their own operation, but they have to be able to handle 
themselves in such a way that they are adequately prepared to be put under 
tremendous strain and stress during the response and, indeed, for 
colleagues around them to be able to recognize when that stress is 
affecting their performance to such an extent that they should be relieved 
of their position.93 
                                                 
85 LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 219.   
86 Clarke, “Emotional Intelligence,” 128. 
87 Santiago Rincón-Gallardo and Michael Fullan, “Essential Features of Effective Networks in 
Education,” Journal of Professional Capital and Community 1, no. 1 (2016): 16. 
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Volume 6 Issue 1 (2011): 69. 
89 Clarke, “Emotional Intelligence,” 128. 
90 Ibid., 137. 
91 Ibid., 135. 
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Moreover, learning in groups engages the group dynamic.94 Group learning 
environments expose students to leadership styles that may be considered different or 
aloof, but that can reveal more creative solutions to standard problems.95 The learners 
also often engage different emotions while navigating the prevailing group atmosphere.96 
Learning should also change as the desired goals shift and/or become more 
complicated.97 Again, group learning environments are optimal when the student is faced 
with a complex problem and complicated solution.98 General, individual training may not 
be appropriate for more complex objectives. “There is a need for more training for 
specific job functions or responsibilities as well as the team approach. The training needs 
to be focused on the requirements of the team concerned.”99 Corporate response to 
training for emergencies addresses it as such: 
Emergency response focuses on the reaction to the physical emergency to 
protect people, the environment, and property. Emergency Management 
concentrates on managing the immediate repercussions of the emergency, 
for example, the media and public reaction, minimizing its impact on 
normal operations and ensuring the emergency response team is handling 
the incident in an adequate way. Crisis Management can be defined as the 
loss of management control; so the corporate team is tasked with 
developing and implementing pre-emptive strategies to secure the 
company’s long-term future which has been threatened by the 
emergency.100 
Adult learning should be in depth and engaging.101 For true learning to occur, 
training should not only involve structured learning objectives, but should engage 
                                                 
94 Robert Coffee and Garath Jones, “Why Should Anyone Be Led by You?” Harvard Business Review 
(September-October 2000): 15.   
95 Ibid.   
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emotional involvement through the use of skilled facilitators and structured reflection 
sessions.102 
D. ONLINE DISTANCE LEARNING 
A current trend for accomplishing learning goals is utilizing online platforms, 
which expand access, particularly over vast geographic areas, and alleviate capacity 
concerns.103 While online learning does not need to be mutually exclusive of classroom-
teaching methods, there is evidence to suggest exclusively networked learning can be 
effective, and can be utilized to engage diverse and interactive relationships between 
learners.104 However, for this method of delivery to succeed, three things are needed: 
quality and reliable technology, engaged instructors with a positive attitude toward 
technology and control of the technology, and students who have some degree of 
technological savvy.105 Most importantly, the students must be self-motivated. 
The online learning environment should always allow for quality 
interaction between the learners and content, learners and teacher, as well 
as learners and peers. … The interaction with content should not just be a 
one-way interaction via a purely text display or conversion of learning 
materials to digital forms. The organization of online learning materials 
may include other forms which have the capability of providing immediate 
feedback and stimulating the learning process. The knowledge exchanges 
generated from interaction among the learners and between learners and 
teacher have become the essential learning materials for open distance 
learners.106 
Keeping students engaged under the proactive guidance of a teacher, who is 
orchestrating the environment, allows them to take charge of the learning experience and 
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produce deeper learning.107 Conversely, it has been found that while students appreciate 
the flexibility online learning offers, they are frustrated by the lack of interaction and 
response to help when needed.108 
Through online group interaction, students can “seek course related information 
and clarification, and they can exchange and share knowledge” on a larger scale.109 It 
exposes students to larger groups with outside connections they can access for new 
expertise and ideas.110 Even learners who do not engage in interactive content have been 
shown to learn simply by observing others online.111 Ongoing interaction can help a 
teaching organization change the instructional practice, adjust the approach to 
knowledge, and create a highly effective training platform while avoiding the common 
pitfalls of producing “no or superficial changes to instructional practice and to the 
systems that are maintaining the status quo.”112 Online learning can be an effective 
group-learning environment, but it requires more than simply providing abundant 
material online; it must remain true to the objectives of the course.113 Most importantly, 
while it allows a shift in the instructor’s academic role—and decreases the instructor’s 
burden—interaction between instructors and peers is still critical to the success of the 
learning platform.114 
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E. THE HEILMEIER CATECHISM 
The Heilmeier Catechism was created by previous Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency Director George H. Heilmeier to help the agency’s officials determine if 
a project and its associated risks were worth engaging.115 It consists of seven questions to 
“help agency officials think through and evaluate proposed research programs.”116 Naval 
Postgraduate School Research Associate Kristin Darken modified this approach and 
narrowed it to four questions specific to the adult educational field:   
1. Who is your audience?   
2. What are you trying to accomplish?  
3. What strategies work best?  
4. How do you know you have been effective?117 
This framework has been utilized at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security for organizing, delivering, and evaluating courses and 
material for the changing audience.   
                                                 
115 “The Heilmeier Catechism,” Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, accessed November 18, 
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III. INVESTIGATION 
To understand how ICS came to be adopted as the nation’s all-hazard response 
strategy, one must first understand how ICS was formed and how it became an incident 
management tool for the fire service, and the method currently utilized to measure its 
success.   
A. BACKGROUND OF ICS 
The Incident Command System was originally designed in the 1970s to handle 
large-scale incidents.118 Its first incarnation was developed in California as part of the 
Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) 
program to mobilize and coordinate a statewide fleet of fire units to deal with devastating 
wildfires.119 The National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWCG) is one of the most 
prolific ICS users and one of its largest advocates.120 The NWCG remains a staunch 
example of the system’s ability to effectively handle large-scale incidents.121 It is 
important, however, to keep the NWCG’s response level in mind: the individuals that 
comprise this group are coordinators, not initial responders.122 Phoenix Fire Department 
Chief Alan Brunacini saw the advantages of ICS, but noted that it was uniquely designed 
to deal with large-scale incidents.123 His department modified ICS for smaller-scale 
incidents in a program that was known as Fire Command. His teachings were published 
in a book of the same name in 1985 and adopted by many fire departments across the 
United States.124 Fire Command is now in its second print (2002). The Brunacini ICS 
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method has evolved and is still being taught as the “Blue Card Command Series.”125 
Brunacini’s Fire Command is a very specific to the fire discipline, and Blue Card is a 
training curriculum that follows suit.126 
After 9/11 and the pursuant executive orders that created NIMS, ICS evolved into 
the publicly mandated operational requirement that exists today. The program’s current 
instructor’s guide notes that ICS is a scalable system that can be used for all events, and 
that can evolve as incidents grow in size and escalation.127 
One of the basic tenets of ICS is that incidents begin and end on the local level.128 
Local response units are the first to arrive and begin mitigation.129 If the incident exceeds 
their scope, they bring in additional help (all the way to the federal level) until the 
incident is stabilized.130 It is important for ICS to remain flexible as these incidents 
expand.131 When the incident has been stabilized and higher-level resources are no 
longer needed, they are demobilized; the local responders are the last remaining on the 
scenes to complete the final tasks of recovery.132 
Another of ICS’ tenets is for all personnel to function effectively as a team, even 
if they have had little training together.133 Applying this teaching methodology to 
incidents such as wildfires and floods is easy, because the incident expands over time. 
The concern is how to train the initial incident commander when her or she arrives to 
chaos, is overwhelmed with needs, has limited resources, and cannot staff all the 
functions needed for ICS. It is during these responses that flexibility is key for incident 
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management structure to operate on limited resources but still effectively engage 
additional resources as they arrive.134 This flexible expansion does not always occur as 
intended.  
B. CURRENT MEASUREMENT METHODS 
The first obstacle this study faced was evaluating the current measurement 
methods used to gauge ICS adoption. First, the only tool the Emergency Management 
Institute (EMI) utilizes to measure training objectives is a written examination at the 
conclusion of training, which exclusively measures learning.135 There is no additional 
survey administered to measure reactions to the training, behavioral changes, or long-
term results from the training.136 EMI does an excellent job of giving students access to 
the courses and ensuring they can pass a written test at the end of training, but does not 
address if learning objectives are actually met, and if the knowledge and ability leave the 
classroom.137   
DHS employed a tool called NIMSCAST (NIMS Compliance Assistance Support 
Tool) to determine if local authorities were incorporating NIMS. NIMSCAST was not 
much more than an annual survey filled out by the agencies to gauge NIMS 
compliance.138 ICS implementation was measured by the percentage of personnel within 
an agency who completed ICS training. This simple completion rate is not an ideal 
measure of training, as it only measures an agency’s theoretical capability to respond to a 
hazard, not if the agency is actually utilizing the system.139 NIMSCAST has since been 
                                                 
134 FEMA, ICS 200 Instructor Guide, 8.15–17. 
135 Phone call to EMI, Emmitsburg, MD placed on August 19, 2015. Message left by Brandy from 
independent study program.  
136 Donald L. Kirkpatrick and James D. Kirkpatrick, Evaluating Training Programs: The Four Levels 
(San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2006), 22–38. 
137 No measurement levels for students could be found other than written test completion at the end of 
the course.  
138 Hildebrand “Coerced Confusion,” 277. 
139 Jackson, Applying Lessons Learned, 3–4. 
 24 
discontinued for budgetary reasons; the website is offline and no documentation has been 
released since a NIMS Alert issued May 25, 2011.140 
Ideally, DHS would be able to go out in the field and actively evaluate the 
implementation of NIMS and ICS. Unfortunately, if DHS could not find the resources to 
maintain the basic NIMSCAST website, it may be safe to assume this level of evaluation 
is not a realistic goal; the size of this nation and number of incidents encountered each 
year make this hands-on evaluation even less reasonable. Instead, to measure 
effectiveness, this thesis uses written literature on incidents published in trade journals 
and other master’s theses that have studied the topic.   
C. DRILLING DOWN WITH THE FIVE WHYS 
While ICS has proven effective in some situations, there are still concerns with its 
use as an all-hazard system. The NWCG effectively utilizes the ICS system on an annual 
basis to mitigate wildland fires across the United States, with the highest frequency of 
occurrences in California, North Carolina, and Texas.141 However, this does not mean 
that ICS is an effective method to handle other incidents. As noted, Renaud and Moody 
voice concerns from the law enforcement side that this tool is not suited for rapidly 
evolving chaos or rapidly unfolding acts of violence. Renaud outlined how acts 
independent of a standardized command structure saved lives.142 Moody also advocates 
that individuals in dynamic situations performing independently, as trained, are more 
effective than the centralized command advocated by the ICS system.143 Even 
representatives of the fire service are concerned with how overly complicated ICS has 
become since NIMS adoption.144 These concerns were used to frame the inquiry of this 
thesis.   
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1. Why Do We Need Incident Management Systems? 
Douglas Hubbard is a professional risk management advisor for both the public 
and the private sector.145 He refers to risk management’s four strategies to deal with risk: 
avoid, reduce, transfer, and retain.146 Avoidance is defined as not engaging in activities 
that will incur risk.147 Emergency responders engage in preventative measures such as 
fire prevention activities and community policing to achieve this goal.148 However, 
effective these programs are, there will still be incidents: 
No matter how hard we try there will be serious accidents because of the 
interactive complexity (which allows the inevitable errors to interact in 
unexpected ways and defeat safety systems) and tight coupling (in which 
small errors propagate into major ones) of most risky systems. 
Catastrophic accidents are normal (though rare) because they are inherent 
to the system.149 
The basic concept of ICS is to provide a simple, coordinated system that all responders 
can utilize, understand, and follow when risk is realized and disaster occurs.150   
a. A Standard System 
Before ICS was adopted as an all-hazard tool, the fire service noted the problems 
that can occur when responders are utilizing inconsistent systems. Because so many 
hybrid systems were adopted, the National Fire Service Incident Management 
Consortium was formed in 1990 to develop a single system.151 They found, “to be 
effective, an [incident management system] must be suitable for use regardless of the 
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type of jurisdiction or agency involvement”; this allows “resources committed to the 
incident [to move] quickly and effectively with the least disruption to existing 
systems.”152 The system was built adopting common business management tasks such as 
planning, directing, organizing, coordinating, communicating, delegating, and evaluating 
but still remained flexible in order to accommodate the dynamic and dangerous 
environments encountered in emergency service.153 
b. Overwhelming Conditions 
A standard system also gives first responders an organized starting point and a higher 
likelihood of success when they are faced with an overwhelming situation.154 Studies 
have shown that freezing when faced with danger is a normal human response, ingrained 
as a natural reaction to a predator-versus-prey situation.155 However, this response is not 
acceptable for first responders; when faced with danger, they are expected to act and 
react in order to mitigate disaster. The desire to overcome this innate reaction is why 
response systems and, in turn, training systems, are created.156 The intended result is for 
the training and “muscle memory” to take over, allowing responders to work together as 
a team to mitigate the incident.157 Renaud addresses this concept in her thesis by citing 
discussions of recognition-primed decision-making.158 This concept is effectively the 
same: through building familiar responses through prior experiences, the mind will have 
a mental slide show (or routine action) to automatically fall back upon when faced with 
stress and conflict, reducing the need for active, critical thought.159  
                                                 
152 Ibid., 1.5, 1.6. 
153 Ibid., 1.6. 
154 Richard Baldwin, “Training for the Management of Major Emergencies,” Disaster Prevention and 
Management: An International Journal, Volume 3, Issue 1, (1994): 19.   
155 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 
6. 
156 Baldwin, “Training for Management,” 16–23.   
157 Torkel Klingberg, The Overflowing Brain:  Information Overload and the Limits of Working 
Memory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 88; Cameron, “An International Company’s 
Approach,” 64. 
158 Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos,” 65.   
159 Klingberg, Overflowing Brain, 84 
 27 
c. Maintaining Reasonable Control and Focus 
The desire to limit the amount of conscious thought and decision-making is 
actually in line with one of the basic components of ICS: keeping span of control 
between three to seven so that leaders do not get overwhelmed and lose track of those 
they are trying to supervise.160 George Miller, a pioneer of psychology, discovered most 
people can process about seven pieces of information in the mind at one time, but most of 
these functions are background tasks that support the overall goal.161 The executive 
portion of the brain (that section of the brain that makes conscious and complex 
decisions) is only able to do a few things at one time; and trying to make someone do too 
much at once only creates more stress.162 In stressful situations, the number of conscious 
decisions one can effectively make decreases, creating tunnel vision.163   
There is a biochemical explanation for this phenomenon: When we experience 
stress, we release hormones that affect the pre-frontal cortex, which is the decision-
making portion of our brains.164 Jonathan Cohen suggests that this portion of the brain is 
crucial in resolving conflict, overcoming fear, and making decisions based upon 
judgment and critical thought instead of simply responding to emotions and innate 
compulsions.165 So if we stress the brain and inhibit the pre-frontal cortex’s ability to 
make critical thought, the result is that we make poor decisions under stress.166 Current 
EMI training curriculum recognizes that this consequence is not acceptable in emergency 
response. As the ICS 200 course explains:  
Effective decision-making can avert tragedy. … Conversely, poor 
decision-making or the absence of decisions potentially can result in injury 
or death to victims or responders. … Poor decisions in the early stages of 
an incident can make the responders’ job more difficult and more 
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dangerous. In addition, they can give rise to much more critical or 
complex decisions.167 
Systems that order and limit stress help responders make clear decisions that 
engage critical thought. Thus, it is important to develop and adopt a standardized disaster 
control system such as ICS.  
2. Why Are Organizations Failing to Adopt and/or Implement ICS? 
They are several reasons why an agency would adopt any new system. In ideal 
situations, organizations see value in a new idea that purports benefits, and thus they 
voluntarily adopt the system. Sometimes, however, someone is mandating or coercing the 
organization to adopt the system. The fire service has long been the originator and 
champion of successful ICS implementation—for example, National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) 1710 recommends fifteen to seventeen firefighters on a 2,000-
square-foot house fire, and this number of working firefighters could be considered a 
fairly routine response.168 Other response agencies have not experienced this need or 
success on a regular basis and therefore would not necessarily have a need to adopt 
ICS.169 The ICS training documents themselves acknowledge that more than 95 percent 
of all national incidents are handled with the initial first responders and require no formal 
plan.170  
a. Required Participation 
The only federal agency to directly require the use of ICS was Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which has regulation for agencies responding 
to hazardous materials events.171 DHS did not directly mandate the use of ICS as a law 
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for local responders, but they did coerce agencies by making it part of NIMS.172 Any 
agency wanting federal funding must attain and maintain NIMS compliance in order to 
be eligible to receive these funds.173 A significant part of NIMS compliance is the 
adoption and maintenance of ICS and ICS training.174 Did this requirement result in 
many agencies taking the NIMS training without the goal of acceptance, but simply with 
the goal of attaining NIMS compliance and maintaining the flow of federal funds? Jensen 
argues this occurrence is perhaps the case.175   
b. Failing to Work Together 
A key to successful collaboration is to make sure all players are on the same 
page.176 It has been found that “organizations can harness complexity by enhancing 
interoperability among organizations.”177 Right now, the federally adopted mechanism to 
establish core principals and attain interoperability is the ICS system.178 But repeated 
organizational failures during large-scale incidents involving multiple agencies continue 
to occur.179 Hurricane Katrina is an often-cited glaring example, but it is questionable 
whether the ICS system itself failed, or if there were simply too few responders to 
support the system successfully.180 However, ICS was developed in essence for events 
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like Katrina, to integrate disparate response units for large events, regardless of whether 
or not they utilize the system on a routine basis.181   
Bertram’s research indicated that mandates do play an important role in 
organizational acceptance, but equally important is an understanding of the need for the 
system.182 His studies focused on preparation for the 2002 Winter Olympic games, 
demonstrating that organizations will adopt collaborative systems when the need is 
perceived; there is understanding that agencies will be dependent upon each other’s 
efforts; and leaders desired to be prepared and to protect their reputations.183 This 
concept of leader preparation and reputation will echo throughout this study, and affects 
the understood need and interagency interdependency.184 Donahue and Tuohy noted that  
Responders, like citizens, would rather believe that the possible worst case 
just will not happen. This kind of denial stems in part from the fact that it 
is important for emergency responders to have confidence and courage in 
the face of extreme diversity. One incident manager explained: “The 
hardest thing is to train a firefighter or a cop to know that they’re 
overwhelmed. They are trained to feel like they can handle it.” It’s a rude 
awakening to recognize your own mortality, but we’ve got to.185 
Interestingly, Bertram’s study focused on a large, known upcoming event.186 The 
participants had time to plan and prepare for the event and the system utilized was clearly 
identified.187 The failure question focused not on if the organization failed because of the 
system, but if leaders failed to collaboratively institute the system.188   
                                                 
181 Stambler and Barbera, “Engineering,” 7.  
182 Christopher D. Bertram, “Factors that Affect Interagency Collaborations: Lessons during and 
Following the 2002 Winter Olympics,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 11–12. 
183  Ibid., 23–33. 
184 Oh, “Strategic Uses,” 8–9.  
185 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 15.   
186 Bertram, “Factors that Affect Interagency Collaborations,” 7. 
187 Ibid., 8–9. 
188 Ibid., 4–6. 
 31 
c. Atypical Users and Discomfort 
Bertram’s situation does differ from initial emergency response, where the 
question remains if ICS is the correct system. If responders do not use ICS regularly, 
there could be expected emotional barriers to learning and adopting a new system. As 
Nicholas Clarke found: 
In social learning, individuals negotiate new meaning from experiences 
that challenge previously held understanding through a process called 
critical reflection and dialogue. Participation and risk from the outset 
generate feelings in learners such as anxiety, uncertainty and some initial 
discomfort.189 
This discomfort could understandably lead to rebellion against a system or a half-hearted 
attempt at compliance, particularly if there is no perceived need in the first place.   
To help practitioners gain familiarity with the system and reduce incurred risk, 
NIMS required agencies to utilize ICS when organizing pre-planned events.190 Hubbard 
risk reduction as engaging in activities that will incur risk, but while taking steps to lessen 
the risk.191 Many agencies currently use planning tools—such as SWOT (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Analysis or FEMA’s Threat and Hazard 
Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) program—to identify threats and develop 
response plans.192 This pre-planning phase may give practitioners the opportunity to 
engage in and practice the command, general staff positions, and responsibilities in a 
controlled, unrushed environment.  
During this process, it is the planning section’s responsibility to “prepare 
strategies and plans, as alternative strategies and plans for the incident.”193 The best 
                                                 
189 Clarke, “Emotional Intelligence,” 127. 
190 FEMA, ICS-200  Instructor Guide, 1.7. 
191 Hubbard, Failure of Risk Management, 27. 
192 “SWOT Analysis,” Mindtools, accessed October 10, 2016, https://www.mindtools.com/pages/
article/newTMC_05.htm; FEMA, Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Guide: 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2013). 
193 Incident Management Training Consortium (IMTC), All-Hazards Incident Management Team 
Response and Planning Guide 2016 (Oakhurst, CA: IMTC, 2015), 4.3.   
 32 
response structure for initial phases may be determined during this exercise. A series of 
puzzle-solving experiments at MIT during the 1950s found the following results, which 
could explain the why some practitioners struggle to decide when to use which type of 
problem-solving structure: 
It was found that centralized structures … were far more conducive to 
performance (solving the puzzle faster) in contrast to decentralized or 
flatter structures. … However, later research ... revealed that decentralized 
structures actually worked better than centralized structures when tasks 
become more complex.194 
d. Failure to See Need outside Selves 
Emergency response during large-scale incidents takes individual agencies—
which are very effective at operating individually—and forces them to work together as 
part of a larger response mechanism over longer periods of time.195 Garath Morgan 
notes: 
Many organizations encounter great problems in dealing with the wider 
world because they do not recognize how they are a part of their 
environment. They see themselves as discrete entities faced with the 
problem of surviving against the vagaries of the outside world, which is 
often constructed as a domain of threat and opportunity.196 
J. Jensen’s studies have found this to be the case, particularly in rural America 
where agencies have completed the training and attained NIMS compliance without 
actually adopting the full ICS response procedure as an agency.197 It is for this reason the 
method of NIMS compliance measurement becomes an important issue. There is a 
significant difference between an individual completing training and passing a test and 
that individual “buying into” the training and actually putting it into practice at his or her 
own organization.   
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Key personnel are not seeing the value in ICS adoption and the value of engaging 
others to share risk.198 Transfer of risk is defined as giving the risk to someone else, such 
as in purchasing insurance.199 Transferring risk in the emergency response plan can occur 
with the incorporation of incident management teams (IMTs).200 Risk transfer can be 
completed in full by requesting an IMT to assume overall responsibility of the incident 
with a written delegation of authority.201 However, IMTs can be engaged without 
releasing full control and authority. The IMT may simply be there to support operations 
through logistical support, situational analysis, resource tracking, or documentation.202 
These resources—and the role they are expected to play—must be identified before an 
incident occurs, as “mutual trust and access to help [are] the most import factors in self-
managed teams.”203 More importantly, it has been found that successful managers 
develop positive working relationships and understandings with key people.204   
Arguments remain that many agencies completed ICS training because they were 
mandated by FEMA and NIMS, but they never actually bought into the common 
operating system.205 Bertram addressed interagency collaboration in relation to the 2002 
Winter Olympics public service planning and operations.206 His findings agreed that a 
mandated system was important for support.207 However, his findings also indicated that 
personnel will continue to support a system if participants see a need and there is 
sufficient trust and leadership.208 In part, this problem arises from a “lack of trust 
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between agencies and a lack of understanding across disciplines.”209 Resultantly, “ICS is 
in common use, but it is not understood and implemented in a consistent manner.”210 
Any system reliant upon team efforts must have key leadership personnel buy-in to be 
successful.211   
3. Why Are Key Personnel Not Seeing the Value in True ICS Adoption?  
Key personnel in disciplines other than the fire service have made the argument 
that ICS is not an effective tool for all situations.212 There are two components to this 
argument. First, there is the consideration that the system itself is flawed. Second, that the 
system is sound, but the application of the system to all hazards and all disciplines, in all 
situations, is a flawed exercise.213 The success of FIRESCOPE’s model ICS led FEMA 
to adopt ICS as a tool for any incident response.214 With NWCG’s further development 
of ICS, the Red Card system, and the annual recurrence of wildland fires, ICS has proven 
an effective management tool for at least some arenas of incident management.215 These 
successes support the assertion that ICS is not a flawed system in some contexts. 
However, the question remains if this system is applicable to all threats and disciplines in 
the all-hazards environment. The system may work well for some situations, but is not 
applicable in all situations.216    
a. ICS Is Too Complex 
Both Moody and Renaud believe that ICS is not the appropriate system to address 
chaotic events. They argue, instead, for a solution based on “retooling” operational 
response and “sensemaking” methods, respectively.217 Moody, supporting other social 
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scientists, explains that the nature of the event should determine the pertinence and 
beneficence of ICS and that ICS has proven unsuccessful for the law enforcement 
model.218 He argues that the “success of ICS within its originating work groups—
stability of leadership, relationships, and networks—are unlikely to be present for many 
of the work groups on which the federal government now seeks to impose NIMS/
ICS.”219 He further explains that chaotic environments, such as active shooter situations, 
will “precede establishment of centralized command and control,” echoing Tallen’s 
argument that our current command and control system is ineffective and has “left 
America ill prepared to respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist paramilitary 
attack.”220 Responders at this type of incident are functioning in a “highly intense, highly 
complex and low familiarity crisis” that cannot be anticipated and is difficult to resolve, 
and for which ICS does not provide effective management.221 In response, he advocates 
for pre-identified teams that follow the USMC fire team model: small units with similar 
training and goals, but a limited overall command structure focused more specifically 
upon accomplishing tactical objectives.222  
Renaud echoes many of Moody’s concerns about ICS appropriateness during the 
initial event response.223 NIMS is “useful training,” she says, but “it misses the 
educational component needed to make it a viable holistically appropriate tool and 
philosophy for even response.”224 She proposes an alternative system that can function in 
confusing environments, and that identifies personnel beforehand who are uniquely 
suited to functioning, thinking, and ultimately leading in this type of environment.225 
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Her argument does differ slightly from Moody’s that initial response chaos leads to 
unfamiliarity.226 Instead, she argues that complex parts can be broken into smaller, more 
familiar—and more easily addressable—components.227 
Renaud’s approach may be new, but applying chaos theory to organizations is not. 
Chaos/complexity theory is a long-recognized theory of business management explaining 
that as, an organization is pushed to the “edge of chaos” and deals with external forces 
and internal dynamics, true leaders and order will naturally emerge.228 It is therefore the 
managers’ role to “shape and create ‘contexts’ in which appropriate forms of self-
organization can occur.”229 Both thesis authors effectively argue for simpler systems that 
prioritize and complete critical life-saving tasks over the resource-management tasks they 
believe are dictated by ICS.230   
Moody and Renaud’s root argument is that, to be appropriate for initial response, 
ICS must be simplified. Agencies may determine during their threat assessment that a 
centralized structure is not conducive to the initial chaotic stages of an incident or their 
response model:   
For structural stability, hierarchy has clear advantages. If an individual 
organization’s activities can be coordinated and managed effectively in 
hierarchal system, organizations can decrease unnecessary confusion and 
duplication in operations. … However, in hierarchy, creative but 
unauthorized efforts for adaption can be easily punished by strict rules of 
hierarchy, and the collective action problem can induce destructive 
competitions instead of collaboration among organizations.231 
Adaptive organization is not a new concept in ICS management. Prior to 2001, 
ICS—as FEMA taught it to the fire service with a discipline-specific structure—included 
what was known as “fast-attack mode.”232 During this mode, it was noted that critical 
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incident stabilization was needed immediately; it excused the company officer to act 
rather than to assume “command mode.”233 This exemplifies a comparison between early 
and later ICS versions; “it is apparent that some of the concepts described during ICS 
development were significantly narrowed.”234 ICS should not limit any responder’s need 
to take immediate action for critical intervention.   
If agencies decide to take this path, they must keep in mind what ICS was 
designed for—to provide core doctrine to keep all responders on the same page.235 They 
should be prepared for incidents that cannot be handled by the local response team and 
that will engage additional agencies. Transitioning to a larger response and integrating 
into a hierarchal response could prove problematic.  
When organizations try to pursue complementary use of heterarchy to 
hierarchy, they need to address the two related problems. The first one is 
that there is a tension between structural stability and operational 
flexibility in transition from heterarchy to hierarchy. … The second issue 
is that hierarchy is not originally designed for the management of 
unplanned interaction of emergent organizations.236 
This is not to say agencies should not develop alternative plans for response that do not 
follow traditional hierarchy. It simply means their plans should indicate how they will 
transition to a recognized system that is understood and adopted by all responders. 
Evidence suggests “there is a need to combine both, coordination by plan and feedback, 
in order to move toward a more self-organize situation in which organizations cooperate 
collectively to respond efficiently to the disaster.”237 
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b. Operations before Command 
Responders and researchers alike desire a close examination of the operations 
section in the initial response, and how planning factors into the overall response.238 The 
current ICS courses focus heavily upon the roles of the command and general staff as 
they work through the Planning “P” in preparation for the next operational period.239 The 
Planning “P” or Planning Process, shown in Figure 1, is a series of detailed steps a team 
works through to prepare an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the next operational 
period.240 This cycle is represented in the upper circle of the P in Figure 1—it is the focus 
of a great deal of the ICS-300 and -400 training curriculums.241 The stem of the P 
represents the initial response, not the planning cycle.242 Attempts to engage in planning 
cycle activities reserved for the top of the cycle are misplaced if they occur during the 
initial response.243 If responders try to complete planning during initial response to fill 
command positions required by later steps of ICS, they may end up neglecting 
operational tasks that could be mitigating the incident.244    
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Figure 1.  The Planning P Diagram245 
The ICS training courses focus highly on the upper circle of the Planning P. The 
focus of this study, however, is the role ICS plays in the first three blocks of the “P” and 
the development of the incident action plan during the incident’s first and initial 
operational period. This research does not intend to criticize the aforementioned 
professionals in their chosen fields and chosen tactics, particularly law enforcement. But 
there are lingering concerns about their overall arguments in relation to the ICS system. 
Teeter very effectively addresses the confusion about the system, stating, “ICS is not a 
strategy for an incident. It is the management of the management of the incident.”246   
Both Renaud and Moody soundly argue that regimented ICS is not effective for 
managing violence. It is not the purpose of this thesis to ascribe one set of tactics to 
                                                 
245 Source: “Integrating the Planning ‘P,’” Kestrel Management, September 19, 2013, 
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handle every incident—the ICS curriculum clearly states that ICS must maintain “needed 
flexibility.”247 However, Moody and Renaud’s arguments are both based in one small 
component of ICS—the operations section and the implementation of operational tactics 
at the ground level. It is evident they are trying to apply concepts of the planning and 
logistics section to the operations section in the first operational period. As noted in the 
Planning P review, these activities are not designed for the initial, chaotic phase of the 
incident, but are intended to support the next operational period. The same operational 
strategy and tactics cannot manage both fire and violence, facilitating the need for a 
flexible system. This study later addresses where the “flexibility” of ICS is lost between 
training and implementation. Important, now, is the understanding that ICS was intended 
to apply core concepts to a response in order to develop an overall system that will 
continue to support and maintain identified strategies and tactics, not supplant them.248  
c. Command Team Implementation 
It is not quite clear who is responsible for ICS implementation at what time and to 
what level. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) Incident Management Team 
training page provides the chart in Figure 2, which outlines the timeline for incidents and 
incident management teams.   
 
Figure 2.  Incident Response Timeline for Command Teams249 
                                                 
247 FEMA, Introduction to ICS-100 Instructor Guide, 2.3. 
248 Ibid., 1.15. 
249 Source: “Incident Management Team Professional Development and Training,” USFA. 
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Following this chart, the training page indicates that advanced-level incident management 
teams are to be engaged in the latter stages of large incidents and local incident teams are 
to be engaged during the initial stages of an incident (with initial incidents being the 
focus of this study). However, it is important to understand the intent of IMTs and the 
related training for initial responders.   
FEMA designates an All-Hazard Incident Management Team (AHIMT) as “a 
comprehensive [team] resource to either enhance ongoing operations through provision 
of infrastructure support, or when requested, transition to an incident management 
function to include all components/functions of a Command and General Staff.”250 The 
current training addresses IMTs, but formal team training begins at the Type 3 level. 
There is now an Emergency Management Institute-recognized Type 3 IMT (O305) 
training course. As explained in more detail in forthcoming Section C4a of this chapter, a 
Type 3 incident requires multiple resources and may extend over several operational 
periods, but it is not large enough to require the state or federal response as associated 
with a Type 1 or 2 incident. Type 3 teams comprise multiple personnel from several 
agencies across a regional or state level.251 Smaller incidents, which account for 90 
percent of responses,252 are defined as Type 4 or 5 incidents. Type 4 or 5 teams are 
smaller regional or individual agency teams. There is no formal Type 4 or 5 team training 
curriculum, though ICS 300 and 400 training courses were designed for those serving in 
command and general staff positions and intended for those serving on local or regional 
incident management teams.253  
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Moreover, the AHIMT’s expectations for incident response are clearly outlined in 
the EMI NIMS ICS All-Hazards Incident Commander (E/L 905) training course: 
Upon arrival, the AHIMT’s Incident Commander (IC) meets with the local 
IC and the Agency Administrator (County Executive, City Manager or 
Mayor, etc.) to determine what they expect from the AHIMT, and to 
obtain any necessary delegation of authority. The incoming IC then briefs 
the rest of the incoming AHIMT about their role. The AHIMT integrates 
as requested into the current Incident Command System (ICS) 
structure.254 
What is unclear, however, is what the initial responders are expected to brief the 
incoming AHIMT about upon arrival.   
Used as a learning aid and example in the aforementioned incident commander 
instructor course is a sample welcome letter from Thomas Tarp of the California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection that outlines expectations and advice for new 
IMT members. To outline the chaos that is expected, a section of the letter entitled “That 
First Operational Period” states (with the assumption that all key positions of the ICS 
team are now staffed) that responders should expect a “kaleidoscope of efforts”: 
Personnel are working extended hours … the incidents setting could be 
unfamiliar to them. Personnel currently working on the incident may have 
limited information. Resources and materials of all types are invariably 
still en route. Mentally, the team knows what to do and desires to do it. 
Physically, frustration will set in when demands outdistance ability to 
supply.255   
It is important to note that this section of the letter refers to the IMT’s confusion during 
their first operational period—not the first operational period of the incident and of the 
initial first responders. The letter clearly states, “Initial/extended attack troops need relief 
and retrofitting, new line folks need to go out under direction, incident facilities need 
development, long-range planning begins and an in-depth view of all safety aspects of the 
incident is required.”256  
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The Planning P of ICS is the process that deals with managing the overall incident 
response, to be engaged by IMTs.257 As Teeter outlined in his thesis: 
ICS is not a strategy for an incident. It is the management of the 
management of an incident. Setting up an efficient office and running an 
efficient planning cycle does not solve real problems caused by a disaster 
or catastrophic incident. Real people who are experts in their discipline 
will always be needed to develop the strategies and carry out the 
tactics.258 
The steps to implement ICS properly are not clear to many first responders, particularly 
during the earliest phases of an incident.259 The phase of the response to which Moody 
and Renaud reference in their theses should only apply to the first three blocks of the 
Planning P.260 It creates confusion when responders believe that command and general 
staff positions—and the full planning cycle—should be staffed at this phase of the 
incident, which can cause ICS to be implemented improperly. 
4. Why Are Responders Failing to Implement ICS Properly? 
Implementation of a system is difficult without complete understanding of the 
system. And there is evidence that responders do not understand ICS completely.261 At 
the conclusion of her thesis, Renaud argues for a sense-making alternative to ICS; to 
illustrate the need for this alternative, she relays a personal experience during a police-
involved shooting in which ICS, and the role she was assigned within ICS, were 
inappropriate for the response.   
As Logistics [Officer in Charge] that day, I was surrounded by over one 
hundred officers all wanting to do something. (The “resources” tracked 
and assigned out by the logistics section includes people as well as 
equipment.) Unfortunately, I had no task to give them. … There was 
precious little to do.262 
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She argues that, operating under the constraints of ICS, the resources were not properly 
engaged in activities that could have found the suspect and resolved the incident sooner. 
Analyzing this one statement was an important finding in this investigation, as it 
illuminates several concerns.   
First, while a minor observation, the Logistics Section is headed by a logistics 
section chief. This role is not referred to as the logistics officer in charge (OIC), so it is 
not confused with the overall officer in charge: the incident commander (IC). This is a 
minor complaint, but indicates possible confusion in ICS. More importantly, there is clear 
evidence of the misunderstanding of ICS roles. It is true that the logistics section and the 
logistics section chief are responsible for ordering resources.263 However, once these 
resources arrive on scene, it is the responsibility of the resource unit leader in the 
planning section (not the logistics section) to check in and track the resources.264 
Moreover, once the resources are checked in, it is the planning section’s responsibility to 
coordinate with the operations section to appropriately assign these resources where they 
are needed to accomplish the overall strategies and tactics of the incident control.265    
Renaud’s experience serves as an example of key ICS components being 
misunderstood by a highly successful and educated member of the emergency services 
field. It is difficult to use this statement as evidence to either support or decry the 
effectiveness of ICS, because it is unclear if ICS was implemented properly during the 
incident. The question remains if this is because of training, implementation, or 
inappropriateness for the incident type, but what is clear is a misunderstanding of the 
roles of specified ICS positions. 
While Moody does not specifically address the first operational period, he 
addresses overall inappropriateness of ICS for law enforcement application on large, 
chaotic incidents, particularly active shooter responses. His analysis of the attack in 
Mumbai, India, echo Renaud’s arguments that individuals in highly charged 
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environments performing their respective jobs, as trained, are more effective than when 
attempting to implement the ICS system.266 He supports his argument by citing and 
advocating the United States Marine Corps Command and Control manual as it relates to 
fire team operations—the goal of this program is to “manage uncertainty” according to 
the response, as opposed to Moody’s interpretation of ICS’ goal to “manage 
resources.”267 His statement, however, is not entirely correct. Resource management is a 
very important component of ICS, but even the earliest ICS training course clearly states 
that ICS is composed of structures and processes for the overall incident management.268 
Moody’s statement is again an indication of a possible misunderstanding of the overall 
ICS system.  
ICS implementation misunderstandings are not limited to law enforcement. The 
proper steps are unclear to many first responders, particularly during the earliest phases 
of an incident.269 Teeter argues this point in his thesis, but also points to failures in the 
system as an all-hazards generalist tool.270 His overall recommendation was to 
implement ICS from the “bottom up”—as opposed to “top down”—supporting Renaud 
and Moody’s claims that planning and logistics are not applicable in the first stages of the 
incident.271 His assertions are actually in direct conflict with the ICS 200 curriculum, 
which clearly states that the operations section expands from the bottom up.272 This order 
is a departure from the original incarnation of the ICS system (in the wildfire arena) that 
championed all sections be learned from the “bottom up” as part of the Red Card 
program.273 Regardless, it is the operations section that should be responding and 
organizing during the initial stages of the incident. 
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The aforementioned examples offer repeated indications of educated and 
advanced emergency practitioners misunderstanding ICS and roles in ICS systems—to 
the point that analyses in their related master’s theses interpreted the system incorrectly. 
There clearly still remains much confusion as to the overall role of ICS, particularly as it 
applies to the operations section and the first response period.   
5. Why Are First Responders Failing to Understand ICS and Their Role 
in ICS?   
Are the current training programs appropriately training and preparing leaders for 
their roles? John Gabarro studied private sector agencies undergoing managerial 
transitions and noted key findings with successful organizations.274 Successful leaders 
were defined by several key characteristics, including prior experience and learning, 
personal and interpersonal factors, and most importantly, that “the all-purpose manager 
who can be slotted into just about any organization, function, or industry exists only in 
management and textbooks.”275 Further revelations included that for managers to truly 
understand their position, they must undergo a five-step process: 1) taking hold, 2) being 
immersed, 3) reshaping, 4) consolidating, and 5) refining This process usually takes 
about two to three years to complete.276 The training time required of NIMS-compliant 
emergency responders to handle major incidents is considerably shorter than this time 
period. If first responders are not properly trained in the proper implementation of ICS, 
this breakdown could explain the failure to implement ICS properly. 
a. Basic NIMS/ICS Training  
First, this section analyzes the basic NIMS-compliant required training. 
Depending on the size and scope of the incident and the number of personnel and 
resources assigned, DHS will classify the incident as a Type 1 (the most severe) through 
Type 5; as previously mentioned, the smaller-scale and most common events are 
recognized as Type 4 or Type 5 incidents, which incorporate a local response. In regards 
                                                 
274 Gabarro, Dynamics of Taking Charge, 1–9.   
275 Ibid., 68.  
276 Ibid., 7. 
 47 
to training for local responders, the national guidance directs, “All responders serving in 
a command or general staff position must complete ICS-100-/200-/300-/400.”277 The 
foundation of FEMA ICS training begins with the ICS-100 Introduction to the Incident 
Command System course. This course “provides the foundation for higher-level ICS 
training.”278 For many first responders, this is the first introduction they will have to the 
ICS system and the foundation upon which they will build their entire premise of incident 
management under the NIMS model.   
The second ICS course offered is ICS 200, ICS for Single Resources and Initial 
Action Incidents. This course is designed for and the responsibility of “first line 
supervisors (Sergeant/Lieutenant), mid-level management (Captain/Shift Commander) 
and command (Battalion Chief/Division Chief/District Commander/Public Information 
Officer) and general staff (Operations/Planning/Logistics/Finance-Admin.).”279 It is 
during this course that responders are first introduced to leadership concepts, briefings, 
more complex plans, and the actual implementation of ICS to manage incidents.   
Both courses can be delivered online or in person. However, there is a significant 
discrepancy in the total amount of time required between the two delivery methods. The 
online ICS-100 course awards 0.3 continuing education units (CEUs) and states that 
course length is 3 hours.280 However, the instructor manual for this course outlines a total 
of 9.5 hours of classroom delivery, with the time dedicated to pertinent sections as shown 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   ICS-100 Significant Instructional Segments 
TIME ACTIVITY 
10 min Importance of ICS 
12 min Command 
10 min Activity: Assuming Command 
8 min Planning and Organizational Structure 
10 min Activity: Incident Action Plan 
55 min Functions of Incident Command and Command Staff 
2 hr 5 min Functions of General Staff 
1 hr 30 min Putting It All Together 
 
For ICS-200, the online course also awards 0.3 CEU and states course length as 3 
hours, whereas the instructor-led program outlines a total of two days (12.15 hours), 
covering the items listed in Table 2..281 
Table 2.   ICS-200 Significant Instructional Segments 
TIME ACTIVITY 
5 min Incident Assessment 
18 min Management by Objectives 
10 min Preparedness Plans and Agreements 
60 min Activity: Developing Incident Objectives (SMART Objectives) 
20 min Command Staff 
2 min Expanding Incidents 
20 min General Staff 
10 min ICS Tools (Introduction to the ICS 201 Form) 
60 min Activity: Using ICS Form 201, Incident Briefing 
15 min Briefings (Staff-Level/Field-Level/Section-Level) 
10 min Operational Period Briefing 
55 min Activity: Operational Period Briefing 
1 hr 30 min ICS Organizational Flexibility and Incident Complexity 
 
There is no explanation for the discrepancy in training delivery methods and 
hours required.282 More importantly, there is no measure to determine if the online 
delivery method achieves learning and actually gives students new knowledge, skills, and 
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attitudes to implement the system effectively.283 More disturbing is that fact that a simple 
Google search using the keywords “FEMA ICS answers” returns several webpages from 
which students can download the answers, challenge the online test, and receive a 
certificate even though they have not engaged in any learning modules.284 One website’s 
administrator boldly claims, “All the answers on the website work. I am an EMT in New 
York City and work for the 911 system. I know the anger and frustration we all must go 
through to pass these mandatory courses. I am forced to take these myself.”285 
Conversely, the classroom curriculum includes student-involved and instructor-observed 
activities and exercises to ensure learning, as well as the final written exam.286 
One of the key concepts emphasized by the ICS 200 instructor’s guide is 
important in later discussions. The manual states: 
A key principal of ICS is its flexibility. The ICS organization may be 
expanded easily from a very small size for routine operations to a larger 
organization capable of handling catastrophic events. Standardization with 
ICS does not limit flexibility.287 
This model establishes operations, and the introduction and importance of leadership 
during the first response to “provide purpose, direction, and motivation for responders 
working to accomplish difficult tasks under dangerous, stressful circumstances.”288 This 
course dedicates two hours of instruction and the entirety of module #2 to the concepts of 
leadership for first responders, declaring: “Duty is how you value your job … but it is 
much more than simply fulfilling requirements. A leader commits to excellence in all 
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aspects of his or her professional responsibility.”289 Common leadership responsibilities 
outlined by ICS-200 include: 
Supervises the scene of action, evaluates the effectiveness of the plan. … 
Understands and accepts the need to modify plans or instructions. … 
Takes command of assigned resources. … Demonstrate initiative by 
taking action … requires the ability to make sound, timely decisions 
during an incident or event.290  
Also introduced into this program is the first written incident action plan 
document, the ICS 201 form—Incident Briefing. The form is 
an eight-part form that provides an Incident Commander/Unified 
Command with status information that can be used for briefing incoming 
resources, an incoming Incident Commander or team, or an immediate 
supervisor. … Occasionally, the ICS Form 201 serves as the initial 
Incident Action Plan (IAP) until a Planning Section has been established 
and generates, at the direction of the Incident Commander, an IAP.291 
Of key importance in this comment is that it recognizes the planning section has likely 
not been staffed yet and a formal IAP has not been developed. The newest release of the 
ICS 201 contradicts this understanding. Page three of the form is set aside for the incident 
commander to draw his or her command structure as it exists at that time in the incident. 
The original release of the ICS 201 form simply had a blank box provided. The 2010 
update of this document has a structure already initiated, with all of the command and 
general staff positions present.292 Even though the directions indicate that responders 
should “fill in additional organization as appropriate,” and to “modify the chart as 
necessary,” it does not clearly indicate that these positions do not need to be filled at this 
point of the response.293 Could the indication by first responders be that staffing these 
positions and completing this portion of the organization chart is more important in the 
initial stages than staffing and coordinating the operations of the incident? This 
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implication appears to be in direct conflict with the quote presented in this paragraph, and 
guides responders away from a “flexible guide” toward a pre-determined structure at pre-
determined times.    
The next course offerings are ICS 300 and ICS 400, for advanced responders. The 
ICS 300 course guidance states it is designed for those who would serve in “command 
and general staff positions,” or Type 3 incidents, while ICS 400 clearly indicates that it is 
for advanced-level managers.294 
[ICS 400 is] designed for those emergency response personnel who would 
function as part of an Area Command, [emergency operations center], or 
[multi-agency coordination center or group (MAC)] during a large, 
complex incident or event. Or those personnel who are or would likely be 
part of a local or regional Incident Management Team during a major 
incident, whether single agency, multi-agency, or Unified Command.295 
Both of these courses must be completed in an instructor-led environment. The ICS 300 
course is completed in two days of instruction, and ICS 400 in three days. Following the 
established NIMS guidelines, an agency administrator who only intends to command his/
her own agency during an incident and not participate in an area command or incident 
management team can become NIMS compliant with only six hours of online training 
and two days of classroom training in ICS 300, leading to a total of 22 hours of training 
in incident management. Even if an incident commander completes training through the 
ICS 400 level, this training could total as little as 46 hours before the student plays a key 
role in trying to mitigate or control a disaster.   
b. Discipline-Specific ICS Training 
The fire service can avail itself of a significant amount of training in the incident 
command system above and beyond basic NIMS-compliant training. As previously 
mentioned, Alan Brunacini’s book, Fire Command, is in its second print.296 A training 
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business called “Blue Card” is based on this book, but advocates that the program has 
been adopted for an all-hazards approach and integrates with NIMS on Type 4 and 5 
incidents.297 This program involves two steps for initial certification as well as 
continuing education and a three-year recertification process. The initial certification 
requires 40 to 50 hours of online training, followed by hands-on sessions where the 
student completes a simulation, which is directly observed and evaluated by a certified 
instructor.298 This program recognizes the need for ongoing training. The three-year 
training recertification process requires at least 36 “Blue Card-tracked” hours.299 The 
Blue Card program is a private business, but its teaching and system has been adopted by 
many fire agencies across the nation and is endorsed by such groups as the International 
Society of Fire Service Instructors (ISFSI), the International Association of Fire Chiefs 
(IAFC), the Fire Department Safety Officers Association (FDSOA), and the Center for 
Public Safety Excellence (CPSE).300 
The National Fire Academy also offers fire service–specific ICS training 
programs above basic NIMS requirements. These programs are called the Command and 
Control of Incident Operations (CCIO) series and consist of the six classes listed in 
Table 3.301 
Table 3.   CCIO Series Classes 
Course Name Course # CEU/Hours Days 
CCIO  R0312/R0831 4.8/48 6 
CCIO at Target Hazards  R0314/R0825 4.2/42 6 
CCIO at Multi-Alarm Incidents R0297 4.8/48 6 
CCIO at Natural/Man-Made Disasters R0308 6.7/67 10 
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It should be noted that even the most in-depth and longest class in the series (CCIO at 
Natural/Man-Made Disasters) requires only ICS 100 and 200 as pre-requisites and “meets 
the National Incident Management System requirements for ICS 300-level and ICS 400-
level courses.”302 Moreover, these courses are again very discipline specific; the 
“primary focus for this course is directed at the operational component of a fire 
department’s response to these incidents. Emphasis is placed on command and control 
decision-making skills and the interrelationship of the operational function.”303 These 
courses provide the fire service an opportunity to attain an additional 205 hours of 
training above the minimum 6 hours of online training offered in ICS 100 and 200 to 
master implementation of the ICS system. 
Conversely, the Emergency Management Institute does not offer as much 
opportunity to other disciplines such as law enforcement, non-fire department rescue 
teams, or non-fire department EMS agencies. The courses are offered by the Center for 
Domestic Preparedness, and are primarily geared to law enforcement. The courses 
offered are listed in Table 4.304   
Table 4.   Center for Domestic Preparedness Courses 
Course Name Course # CEU/Hours Days 
Field Force Command and Planning MGT-300 2.4/24 3 
Field Force Command: Executive Course MGT-300-C .8/8 1 
Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning and 
Response Actions for All Hazards MGT-360 2.4/24 3 
Technical Emergency Response Training for 
CBRNE Incidents 
PER-260 0.0/32 3 
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While these courses offer law enforcement an opportunity for 88 hours of additional 
training, there are significant differences in the courses. First, the Technical Emergency 
Response Training is specifically geared toward chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) events; while students practice initial command at the 
beginning of the course, the remainder is geared toward “advanced practical application 
in the identification of CBRNE hazards, personal protective equipment (PPE), safety 
considerations, and hazards and evidence preservation,” not necessarily command 
functions.305 The Field Force Command courses are specifically geared toward 
“instruction on incident management, incorporating preplanning considerations and other 
responsibilities of management level responders.”306 The training environment does not 
appear to give law enforcement as many discipline-specific training opportunities to hone 
ICS skills as are afforded to the fire service.  
c. Position-Specific Training 
The greatest opportunity for all responders to receive advanced ICS training, 
regardless of discipline, lies within the position-specific training courses now offered by 
EMI and FEMA. While they are not part of the NIMS-required training, they are 
currently in active delivery and development. These courses are not a general overview of 
the ICS command structure; rather, as the name suggests, they are specific to key 
identified positions within the ICS system, the primary command and general staff 
positions, and the primary unit leader positions that support them.307 There are currently 
more than 31 positions identified from individual resource to incident commander in the 
ICS system.308 The major positions are indicated on the command chart in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Full ICS Command Chart with All Positions 
These training requirements are quite in-depth, are not available online, are 
usually limited to the number of students that can attend them, and are expensive to 
deliver. The finance/administration section is the least time-intensive general staff section 
training, with only two 21-hour courses offered, for a total of 42 hours.309 They escalate 
considerably in commitment from there. The planning section offers courses for two of 
its unit leader positions, situation unit leader (35 hours) and resource unit leader (28 
hours), before taking the planning section chief course itself (28 hours), for a total of 91 
                                                 
309 “E0973: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Finance/Administration Section Chief Course,” Emergency 
Management Institute, accessed October 4, 2016, https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/ntecatalog/ 
EMI#anc-search-results; “E0975: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Finance/Administration Unit Leader Course,” 
Emergency Management Institute, accessed October 4, 2016, https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/ 
ntecatalog/EMI#anc-search-results. 
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hours of classroom time needed to complete the planning section of ICS.310 Table 5 
outlines the total hours involved for each section, not including basic ICS training. 
Table 5.   ICS Position-Specific Section Training311 
SECTION/STAFF EMI COURSE # COURSE/POSITION HOURS 
TOTAL 
HOURS 
FINANCE/ADMIN 0975 Finance/Administration Unit Leader 21 42 0973 Finance/Administrative Section Chief 21 
OPERATIONS 
0960 Group/Division Supervisor 21 
70 0984 Task Force/Strike Team Leader 21 
0958 Operations Section Chief 28 
PLANNING 
0964 Situation Unit Leader 35 
91 0965 Resource Unit Leader 28 
0962 Planning Section Chief 28 
LOGISTICS 
0969 Communications Unit Leader 21 
119 0970 Supply Unit Leader 28 0971 Facilities Unit Leader 35 
0967 Logistics Section Chief 35 
COMMAND  
0952 Public Information Officer 35 
112 0956 Liaison Officer 14 0954 Safety Officer 28 
0950 Incident Commander 35 
TOTAL OVERALL TRAINING 434 
 
The unit leader positions that support the section chief positions are not 
prerequisites to taking the class. However, one of the tenets of ICS is that once command 
or any general staff positions are established, they assume all responsibilities for that 
position unless otherwise delegated.312 This top-down approach means that anyone 
serving effectively in a general staff function should understand the requirements and 
responsibilities of all the unit leader positions that support their position.313 Following 
                                                 
310 “E0964: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Situation Unit Leader Course,” Emergency Management Institute, 
accessed October 4, 2016, https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/ntecatalog/EMI#anc-search-results; 
“E0965: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Resource Unit Leader Course,” Emergency Management Institute, 
accessed October 4, 2016, https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/ntecatalog/EMI#anc-search-results; 
“E0962: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course,” Emergency Management Institute, 
accessed October 4, 2016, https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/ntecatalog/EMI#anc-search-results. 
311 Source: “National Incident Management Systems (NIMS),” Emergency Management Institute, 
accessed October 4, 2016, https://training.fema.gov/nims/. 
312 FEMA, ICS-200 Instructor Guide. 
313 FEMA, “Incident Command System Training: ICS Review Materials,” May 2008, 9, 
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/reviewmaterials.pdf. 
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this guideline, the incident commander should understand all the general staff positions 
and the unit leader positions that support them, indicating that an individual would have 
to undergo no less than 433 hours of training to truly master the incident commander 
position, in addition to the minimum NIMS ICS training required.314 The requirements 
for general staff positions are less substantial but still daunting, ranging from 21 hours for 
the finance/administrative section to 119 hours for the logistics section.  
Every command and general staff–level position has its own position-specific 
training course.315 Only critical unit leader positions have position-specific training 
classes associated with their jobs at this time. Figure 4 and Table 6 indicate which 
positions have position-specific training courses available and outline the position-
specific training hour requirements as compared to current FEMA minimum 
requirements for ICS/NIMS compliance. It should be noted that every level in the 
operations section has an associated position-specific training course available. These 
graphics depict a large discrepancy between the NIMS ICS minimum required training 
and training expected of incident management teams, and offered by EMI and FEMA. 
 
                                                 
314 As indicated by all the FEMA Position-Specific Training Courses as currently offered by EMI. See 
“NIMS,” Emergency Management Institute. 
315 “NIMS,” Emergency Management Institute. 
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Figure 4.  ICS Overview with All Specific Positions
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Table 6.   ICS Training Hours Comparison 
LEVEL COURSE HOURS HOURS  COURSE/POSITION 
Individual 
Responder ICS 100 3 3 ICS 100 
First Line 
Supervisor 
ICS 200 3 
3 ICS 200 
21 Task Force/Strike Team Leader 
Mid-Level 
Management 
21 Group/Division Supervisor 
35 Situation Unit Leader 
28 Resource Unit Leader 
21 Communications Unit Leader 
28 Supply Unit Leader 
35 Facilities Unit Leader 
21 Finance/Administration Unit Leader 
Senior-Level 
Management ICS 300 16 
16 ICS 300 
28 Operations Section Chief 
28 Planning Section Chief 
35 Logistics Section Chief 
21 Finance/Administrative Section Chief 
14 Liaison Officer 
28 Safety Officer 
35 Public Information Officer 
Incident 
Commander ICS 400 24 
24 ICS 400 
35 Incident Commander 
IMT Type 3   40 Type 3 AHIMT (O305) 
TOTAL HOURS 46 530 TOTAL POSSIBLE HOURS 
 
Also included in Table 6 is a new course offered through the National Fire 
Academy, the Type 3 AHIMT training course.316 Although this course if offered through 
the Fire Academy, it is open to all AHIMT members, not just fire personnel.317 It is a 
five-day course offered through local delivery and typically hosts only 24 to 40 
participants.318 At time of this writing, the schedule only indicated five offerings for the 
second half of calendar year 2016 and no offerings for 2017.319 One of the goals of this 
course is to “assist individual responders to perform as viable team members by: 
Demonstrating the goals of NIMS and NRF.”320 Though not specific to any position, the 
                                                 
316 “Incident Management Team Development and Training,” USFA. 
317 USFA, Host Agency Guide: Course Setup Instructions, Type 3 All-Hazard Incident Management 
Team (Type 3 AHIMT) (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2015), 1, https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/imt/
imt_host_agency_guide.pdf.  
318 Ibid., 1.  
319 “Incident Management Team Development and Training,” USFA. 
320 USFA, Host Agency Guide: Type 3 AHIMT, 1. 
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course it is designed for persons serving in specific positions to “develop” and “operate” 
together by “offering practical experience of on-scene operations through extensive 
exercises and simulations … by providing students with the opportunity to perform as 
members of a USFA Type 3 AHIMT.”321 This course gives emergency responders 
another opportunity to hone their ICS skills and further widens the gap between NIMS 
compliance training and total available ICS training.   
To narrow the scope, we will examine the operations section only. The operations section 
functions will be completed at every incident, even if the operations section chief position 
itself is not staffed, as the operations section is responsible for managing the tactical 
operations at an incident.322 Comparison of only the operations section through incident 
command reveals drastic differences in training completion. To fully show the possible 
discrepancies, Table 7 factors in the difference between overall minimum ICS training.  
The overall total in Table 7 (546) differs from the overall total in Table 6 (530) because it 
factors in the difference in ICS 100 (9.5 hours) and 200 (12.25 hours) training completion 
in the classroom setting as opposed to online (3 hours each). 
  
                                                 
321 Ibid. 
322 FEMA, ICS 400 Student Manual, 2.13. 
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Table 7.   Operations Section Training Differences 







1 Individual Responder 
ICS 100 3 3 9.5 9.5 
2 First Line Supervisor 
ICS 200 3 6 12.25 22 
Task Force/Strike Team 
Leader  6 21 43 
3 Mid-Level Management Division/Group Supervisor  6 21 64 
4 Senior-Level Management 
ICS 300 16 22 16 80 
Operations Section Chief  22 28 108 
  ICS 400 24 46 24 132 
  Type 3 AHIMT  46 40 172 
5 IC 
Incident Commander  46 35 207 
Include all Section Chief 
and Unit Leader Positions 
not already included 
 46 339 546 
 
Reviewing only the operations section reveals a vast difference in levels of 
training. A local officer directing the on-scene operations of a major disaster can do so 
with as little as 22 hours of training and remain fully NIMS compliant. The training 
available for incident team members to complete and serve in this capacity could total as 
much as 108 hours of training, a difference of 86 hours, or more than two weeks. If any 
acting incident commander completes the minimum training required for NIMS 
compliance, it totals as little as 46 hours. An incident commander who completes all 
available ICS training offered through EMI completes 546 hours of training, a difference 
of 500 hours, or 12.5 weeks of training. These numbers only include the training hours 
for these programs; they do not include the time for immersion and evaluation required to 
complete the task books associated with these positions.   
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d. Position-Specific Certification  
The All-Hazard Incident Management Team Association (AHIMTA) is a 
grassroots nonprofit organization that has developed and posted a sample guideline for 
emergency responders to train, learn, and ultimately certify for specific positions in the 
incident command system, called the Interstate Incident Management Team Qualification 
System (IIMTQS) Guide.323 While the AHIMTA has no authority in any level of 
government, it is a think tank of experienced ICS practitioners that developed this guide 
from the best practices of NWCG and adapted them to the all-hazards environment.324 
Included in the certification process are not only successful completion of the position-
specific course training and written exam, but also the completion of position-specific 
task books.325 A position-specific task book is a written performance measure of the 
student’s abilities to complete the tasks necessary for each ICS position. Each task is 
specifically listed and it is indicated in the book if the student must perform the task on 
an incident, planned event, scheduled training, or what is classified as a rare event. Each 
task requires two signatures for certification, attained from qualified individuals while 
directly observing the candidate’s behavior. The first signature is attained from a coach 
evaluation indicating that the student performed these tasks under their supervision. The 
second signature must be obtained from a final evaluator who observes the candidate’s 
behavior without assisting the candidate.326 This direct measurement of results adds 
significant commitment to credentialing an individual to serve in one of these positions, 
assuring the student truly grasps and can effectively function within the position.327 This 
time is not included in significant training differences already outlined.   
                                                 
323 “IIMTQS Guide Final,” All-Hazards Incident Management Teams Association (AHIMTA), 
accessed October 9, 2016, http://ahimta.org/resources/May%202016%20IIMTQS%20Guide%20Final.pdf. 
324 “IIMTQS Executive Summary, April 2015,” AHIMTA, accessed October 9, 2016, 
http://ahimta.org/Resources/Documents/IIMTQS%20Exec%20Summary-Apr2015.pdf. 
325 “IIMTQS Fact Sheet, Feb. 2015,” AHIMTA, accessed October 9, 2016, http://ahimta.org/
Resources/Documents/IIMTQS%20Fact%20Sheet%20Feb%2015.pdf. 
326 AHIMTA, Interstate Incident Management Team Qualifications System (IIMTQS) Guide, (Golden, 
CO: AHIMTA, 2016) 33–35. 
327 Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, Evaluating Training Programs, 64–65.  
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Referring back to the review of basic NIMS/ICS training, the current incident 
management understanding is that new leaders are ready to lead after as little as six hours 
of training for front-line officers and 46 hours for incident commanders.328 Can we 
expect the incident managers to truly be prepared to assume any role in ICS with as little 
as 46 hours of training? As outlined previously in Figure Table 5, the EMI position-
specific training program would indicate much more training should be attained.   
The AHIMTA-advocated certification process follows several of the steps 
Gabarro’s research identified.329 It includes an extensive process of training that takes a 
significant amount of time to complete, involves specializing in certain areas as opposed 
to becoming an “all-purpose” manager, and advocates taking hold of the position and 
immersion.330 The position-specific training courses offered by EMI do not attempt to 
cover the entire ICS process and the responsibilities of every section in a short period of 
time. For example, the incident commander course is designed to be five days (40 hours) 
long.331 The class assumes that the student already has a general understanding of ICS 
and completion of at least ICS 100 through ICS 400, and has served in other functional 
positions on IMTs.332   
The “position-specific” title of these classes is apt, as they deal with the 
responsibilities of only one position. For example, the resource unit leader position 
course is 3.5 days long and covers only the responsibility of the resource unit leader, who 
operates under the planning section chief.333 Included in the AHIMTA certification 
process is not only completion of the training, but immersion into the system; students 
are issued task books to be completed so they can be observed before being authorized to 
handle an incident in that position.334  
                                                 
328 This is the total hours of ICS 100-400 courses as noted previously in Table 6, “ICS Training Hours 
Comparison.” 
329 Gabarro, Dynamics of Taking Charge, 7; AHIMTA, IIMTQS Guide, 33–37.   
330 AHIMTA, IIMTQS) Guide, 33–37.   
331 FEMA, NIMS ICS All-Hazards Incident Commander: Instructor Guide, 0.5. 
332 Ibid., 0.3. 
333 Ibid., 1.10–11. 
334 Ibid., 35–37.   
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The entire process is time consuming, as the student must complete the in-class 
time (as required for the specific class) and complete the position task books at an 
incident or event. This overall time can vary dependent upon how long the actual event 
lasts. The frequency of incidents has been a limiting factor for the completion of task 
books, so the AHIMTA process was adapted to allow certain exercises and pre-planned 
events, such as a large public gathering where an IMT is needed, as qualifying events for 
task book completion.335   
e. Summary 
Completion of the position-specific training requires quite a bit of time and 
commitment. Now that these programs are released, it is clear how much training and 
experience are necessary to truly understand and implement the general staff positions 
(operations, planning, logistics, and administration/finance) of the ICS system, and the 
responsibility of each individual position within ICS.336 Trying to create the “all-
purpose” manager, as Gabarro indicates, could be a recipe for disaster. 
  
                                                 
335 AHIMTA, IIIMTQS Guide, 56–60.   
336 The courses are currently being offered in residence at EMI and as local delivery. The schedule of 
classes can be found at https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/ntecatalog/EMI. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
DHS still promotes preparedness as “the shared responsibility of our entire 
nation.”337 Some of the mechanisms used to reach this goal—such as NIMS and ICS 
implementation—may still be valid. Critical consideration must be given to what is 
expected of first responders during the initial response, and how their actions will 
integrate and contribute to the ultimate incident resolution. 
Local agencies respond and mitigate most incidents.338 The point of concern is 
incidents that extend beyond one operational period or are large enough that they require 
various resources from differing agencies to work together. Of particular concern is the 
timeframe during which initial resources are taxed beyond their limits and additional help 
has not yet arrived. The five questions in the previous section indicate that a problem lies 
with responders understanding the system and their role within the system as it is initiated 
and transitioned. The root cause of this confusion appears to lie with responder training.  
Of specific concern is ICS training’s failure to adequately address the initial 
response and the chaos that can prevail. The ICS 200 curriculum covers initial response 
with one slide in the course.339 Perhaps this lack of detail is because ICS’ teaching does 
not effectively address this situation and these operations for all incidents. Christopher 
Bellavita explains the complication with trying to utilize standard means to address 
unusual situations: 
For the routine problems practitioners encounter, they can use their 
discipline’s “normal science,” tested and proven behaviors that reflect 
successful solutions to similar problems. This approach works as long as 
practitioners face “tame problems,” situations characterized by relatively 
well-defined problems, obvious stopping points, and solutions that can be 
objectively judged as right or wrong. The strategies are less effective for 
“wicked problems”: ambiguously defined situations generated by nested 
                                                 
337 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
338 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh,” 20. 
339 FEMA, ICS-200 Instructor Guide, 4.15. 
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social and political complexity, disagreements about what a solution looks 
like, and so on.340 
While many believe all the answers lie within ICS, there are those who see 
deficiencies in the system for every response. As Bellavita articulates: 
Some people believe the incident command system and its National 
Incident Management System extension should be the foundational model 
for all incident response. The National Response Framework holds a 
similar position as disciplinary exemplar. Both models provide general 
solutions to a broad set of problems; they do not provide inviolate rules.341 
Does the statement “both models provide general solutions to a broad set of problems,” 
advocate for the “flexibility” promoted throughout the ICS curriculum? Has “flexibility” 
become a catchphrase in training that is not being exercised? Or is it simply lost because 
the training is rushed in order to check a box, claim compliance, and keep the federal 
dollars coming?  
Current FEMA ICS literature values standardized structures regardless of the 
consistently taughted flexibility in the training. The flexibility of ICS seems to be 
disappearing in exchange for a system that first responders are finding difficult to apply 
to their specific situations.342 Evidence of this change is present in the fact that the 
FEMA Form 201343 is already partially completed with the general staff positions 
indicated.344 It is possible having these positions indicated on the form is confusing 
responders, who who then try toengage the planning cycle and general staff positions 
when they should be simply worrying about the completion of operations and tactics.  
Further evidence of narrowing of scope is present in the newest release of the 
National Engagement draft of the National Response Plan. This document more narrowly 
                                                 
340 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?” 
Homeland Security Affairs 7, no. 1 (2011): 4. 
341 Ibid., 3. 
342 Hildebrand “Coerced Confusion,” 278. 
343 See Appendix. 
344 FEMA, NIMS ICS Forms Booklet, 8. 
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explains that the span of control “should range from three to seven subordinates, with 
five being optimal.”345 As pointed out by reviewers in the open comment period: 
The manageable span of control language needs to be changed regarding 
large law enforcement operations. Language in NIMS 2008, page 47 states 
8–10. Law enforcement OFTEN has span of control on large scale 
incident and events more than 3–7. Many law enforcement agencies at 
events, incident or day to day operations very often operate with more 
than that span of control. Agencies just don’t have the funds to pay for that 
small of a number. Actually, this should be increased for law enforcement 
to 10–12. Many civil disturbance squads have at least 10–15 members on 
the squad. 
To (sic) many people get hung up about the 3 to 7 when there are many 
factors influencing span of control.346 
The change was clear to several respondents, who also noted that the full document was 
not consistently changed; some parts still matched the previous language. The chart on 
page 20, line 661 of the document put the span of control at 1 to 8, and the glossary on 
page 70 put the span of control “between 1:8 and 1:10 for many large-scale law 
enforcement operations,” matching language from the 2008 document and creating 
confusion in the new document.347 Aside from flexibility, this also seems to go against 
the need for discipline diversity taught throughout the position-specific classes. 
The diagram in Figure 5 is very familiar to anyone who has taken a position-
specific class, as it routinely shows up in the curriculum. 
                                                 
345 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh,” 10–11. 
346 “NIMS Comments Received by FEMA,” FEMA, accessed August 14, 2016, 43, 
http://www.fema.gov/nims-comments-received-fema.   
347 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System Refresh,” 20, 70; 
“NIMS Comments Received by FEMA,” FEMA, 43. 
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Figure 5.  Core Competencies Flower Diagram348 
This graphic is know known as the Core Competencies “Flower Diagram” and it is used 
to represent the need for not only the common core competencies taught by ICS, but for 
hazard-specific competencies.349 This diagram seems to indicate the need for diversity 
and flexibility as much as the need for core concepts.  
A. INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY  
If organizations or individuals fail to plan and do not choose to incorporate IMTs 
to manage their incident, they retain full risk by default. This strategy is usually the last 
step in any risk management strategy.350 Applied to incident response, this indicates that 
the agency head determines they or a representative from their agency will retain overall 
command and overall responsibility of an incident through initial response until ultimate 
incident resolution. Whether the agency chooses ICS or another risk management 
strategy, it makes a significant commitment to aggressively plan ahead for not only 
                                                 
348 Source: FEMA, NIMS ICS All-Hazards Incident Commander: Instructor Guide, 1.18. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Hubbard, Failure of Risk Management, 27. 
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routine job responsibilities, but the potential chaos and emerging threats that our world 
now presents. In order to be prepared to handle disasters, they must have a mastery of 
their own chosen profession.351 Moreover, they not only must direct their agency, they 
will also have to work proactively with different organizations. Right now, DHS has 
determined this tool to be ICS under the NIMS framework. Therefore, if an individual 
wants to step up and be the leader of his or her organization, and assume the risks of 
whatever may come, he or she must have made a commitment to understand the tool that 
other agencies will be using.   
Taking responsibility and training for a full incident response takes significant 
time and commitment from multiple personnel and cannot be taken lightly. A lack of 
training was cited as one of the failures in the Louisiana Katrina response352 Gabarro 
indicates that managers in private industry need two to three years to learn and 
understand leadership positions.353 As the following quote expresses, committing to a 
new learning path is often difficult and requires commitment:  
Our brain has not evolved to the point where the new systems that make 
complex thinking possible can easily control the old systems that give rise 
to our base needs and motives, and emotional reactions. This doesn’t mean 
that we’re simply victims of our brains and should just give in to our 
urges. It means that downward causation is sometimes hard work. Doing 
the right thing doesn’t always flow naturally from knowing what the right 
thing to do is.354 
EMI position-specific training currently outlines up to 546 hours of classroom 
training.355 This number does not include time to complete task books as well as 
discipline-specific training, such as the fire services’ CCIO courses. It certainly includes 
more than the 46 hours of training currently required by NIMS. Retaining full risk may 
not be practical for smaller organizations or organizations with high personnel turnover, 
particularly when trying to learn the entire system. Regardless, it is the responsibility of 
                                                 
351 FEMA, ICS-200 Instructor Guide, 2.37. 
352 Hayes, “Failing to Establish a Unified Command,” 3. 
353 Gabarro, Dynamics of Taking Charge, 57. 
354 LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 323. 
355 Refer to chart in Table 7.  
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all responders and initial leaders to complete the initial 100-level basic and 200-level 
training as the starting point for ICS.356 
B. NIMS ICS TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY 
The responsibility to deliver the NIMS training lies with FEMA. Training is 
completed through EMI and the USFA in compliance with the National Training 
Program as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006.357 While the position-specific training programs were designed for members 
serving on IMTs, it remains the responsibility of all to attain at least ICS-100 and ICS-
200 training.358 Regardless of what level emergency responders ultimately attain in their 
ICS training, their education begins with these two initial courses.359 Utilizing the Kristin 
Darken education analysis adaption of the Heilmeier Catechism, the ICS training system 
is examined in the following subsections.360 
1. Who Is the Audience? 
Developing one training method for ICS is an ambitions task, because the 
audience includes all “departments and agencies at all levels of government, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector.”361 The NIMS training 
document specifically identifies the audience as follows: 
The NIMS Training Program is intended for emergency management 
officials and administrators responsible for budgets, planning, and 
procurement, who require guidance on the development and provision of 
NIMS training. In addition, the NIMS Training Program is an informative 
guidance document for the following:  
• National and State policy-makers (elected/appointed officials) 
                                                 
356 “Incident Management Team Professional Development and Training,” USFA. 
357 “Training,” FEMA, accessed November 18, 2016, https://www.fema.gov/training-0. 
358 “NIMS ICS All-Hazards Position Specific Training Program,” FEMA. 
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361 “NIMS Doctrine Supporting Guides & Tools,” FEMA, accessed November 18, 2016, 
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• Key decision-makers from governmental and nongovernmental agencies 
and private sector organizations, such as: 
• Federal departments and agencies  
• State, tribal, and local government emergency management agencies and 
trainers (i.e., State, tribal, and local NIMS Coordinators) 
• Managers overseeing those in mission-critical positions and organizations 
and professional development 
• Human resource managers setting and overseeing personnel policies and 
guidance  
• Other groups charged with developing NIMS-related guidance or training, 
credentialing, or personnel qualifications information362 
The United States hosts a population of 321 million in an area of 3.5 million 
square miles and divided by 50 different states.363 There are more than 1.1 million 
firefighters serving in more than 30,000 different fire departments and more than 1 
million police officers serving in more than 14,500 different law enforcement 
agencies.364 These numbers do not include NGOs, elected officials, or other branches of 
government. When developing one training program for such a large and diverse 
audience, one must understand that “every organization form has distinct strengths, 
distinct limitations and applications in which it is specifically appropriate … an 
organizational structure is not an end in itself, but a means of making people productive 
when working together.”365 FEMA has begun offering ICS courses designed for specific 
fields, such as IS-100.HE “Introduction to the Incident Command System for Higher 
                                                 
362 Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Training Program, 3. 
363 “Quick Facts: United States,” United States Census Bureau, accessed June 13, 2016, 
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Education,” with the overall objective to keep all personnel operating under the same 
core concepts.366 
2. What Is NIMS Trying to Accomplish? 
The stated goal of the NIMS ICS training program is to get all personnel utilizing 
the emergency management system; it was intended to be applicable to all disciplines and 
all hazards.367 Ideally, the goal would be for the training program to conceptualize the 
learning and actually change an organization’s culture to allow for adoption of unified 
response.368 Changing organizational culture, however, is not an easy task. 
Culture is the collective/shared value or perspective adopted or practiced 
by the people in a certain country or region. The members of society 
utilize cultural values and conventions to cope with their world and with 
one another, and the elements of culture are transmitted to later 
generations through socialization and learning. It is a fact that culture and 
cultural institutions have an enduring resilience. As such, the values and 
practices of a certain culture will not be easily affected or transformed 
despite being subjected to the forces of external change. The effects of 
traditional culture towards learning activities are still deeply entrenched in 
spite of the growing prevalence of new ways and modes of learning.369 
Completion of a course is one step in the learning process.370 Changing culture 
and getting people to change is an in-depth process.371 Only one part of this goal will be 
achieved if the iterative process of evaluation is absent and subsequent ongoing program 
change does not occur as a result of learning achievements or failures.  
                                                 
366 “ISP Courses,” FEMA, accessed November 23, 2016, https://training.fema.gov/is/
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3. What Strategies Work Best? 
Although the initial ICS training can be completed in the traditional classroom 
setting, FEMA also adopted an online platform.372 Although this program has ensured 
mass personnel complete the courses, it does not ensure true learning and organizational 
change.373 The online training is not an interactive distance-learning program that utilizes 
active instructors or engages peer and group interaction.374 These social contexts of 
training are critical components of the adult learning process375 and this concept is even 
referenced in the NIMS training guide: 
The [national integration center] encourages a varied composition of 
students for each of the courses offered in the NIMS core curriculum. 
Integrating personnel from multiple disciplines greatly enhances students 
learning experience in training, exercises, and professional development 
for incident response. This allows those from a single discipline to learn 
lessons from students from different disciplines, potentially creating a 
more well-rounded understanding of the course material. Stakeholders and 
instructors should optimize learning environments to include multiple 
disciplines.376 
The ICS online courses are streamlined, making them practical for quick and easy 
completion, but do not engage these components when completed in this format. If the 
goal is course completion, this simple online strategy is very effective. If the goal is to 
develop “ICS core competence” and affect organizational cultural change and universal 
program adoption, a more in-depth strategy is required.377 This strategy should include 
“learning, unlearning, and relearning” by engaging the students with active instructors 
and immersing them in the social learning environment with peers.378 These goals are 
clearly addressed in the ICS training guidance: 
                                                 
372 “ISP Courses,” FEMA. 
373 Clarke, “Emotional Intelligence,” 135. 
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376 Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Training Program, 3. 
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Adult education courses are most effective when instruction incorporates 
the following general principles:  
• Engage adult learners as active, self-directed participants in their own 
learning 
• Recognize factors that motivate adult learners; design courses and adapt 
instructional style accordingly 
• Identify the relevance of the course to student work environments, since 
relevance motivates students and makes it easier for them to comprehend 
the material presented  
• Acknowledge adult learners’ accumulation of diverse professional 
experiences and aspirations and use this experience in context 
• Deliver instruction in a safe, collaborative environment 
• Provide opportunities to critically reflect upon and immediately apply new 
learning in order to transfer that learning into habitual practice379 
Appropriate engagement may help students overcome the roadblocks to learning, find 
value in the information, and begin the transformative process.380 This level of 
engagement does not appear to be occurring in the current online courses.  
4. How Can Effectiveness be Gauged? 
NIMSCAST was the tool being utilized to measure ICS compliance, but it only 
measured if agencies and individuals completed training, not if the system was 
utilized.381 If ICS will continue to be the management tool of incident response, it is 
critical to gain a better understanding of how agencies are utilizing this tool. Most 
agencies already employ a national reporting and statistics-gathering resource that could 
be utilized to examine NIMS and ICS implementation without creating a new or separate 
reporting system. Police have been utilizing the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
Program since 1929.382 The fire service has similarly used the National Fire Incident 
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Reporting System (NFIRS) since 1976.383 These systems are not without faults; however, 
it is important to note that NFIRS not only receives reports of 1,000,000 fires annually, 
but also receives reports of 22,000,000 other emergency events.384 EMS have been 
utilizing a national reporting system called NEMSIS (National Emergency Medical 
Services Information System) since 2001.385 The UCR and NFIR systems have proven 
very effective tools for gathering data, not only for their respective services, but also for 
other agencies. As an example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has utilized 
NFIRS data to issue numerous product recalls.386  
There is an inherent difference between these systems and working ICS 
documents. The national reporting systems are intended to record data after the event, 
while most ICS documents are designed to facilitate completion of tasks during the 
incident.387 However, the national reports can be utilized to gather data to determine if 
ICS forms were utilized on a response. Those who have taken ICS-300 (“the course 
intended for individuals who may assume a supervisory role in expanding incidents”) are 
introduced to the form ICS 201—Incident Briefing.388 This is the most basic form of an 
incident action plan. Its intent is for the initial incident commander to record and relay 
information to the incoming commander on any hazard that involves more than initial 
responders.389 NIMSCAST would simply measure how many people had taken ICS-300. 
NEMSIS, NFIRS, and UCRcan record how many times an ICS 201 form was completed 
on an incident by simply adding one more question to a report that is already completed 
for responses. This step could serve as the beginning of a viable measuring process to see 
if the concepts taught in ICS training are actually employed in the field. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Getting every responder on the same page is an ambitious goal for a nation of this 
size with such diverse governmental and NGO resources. Emergency responders must 
understand the commitment they have made to their agency, local populace, and the 
nation. The nation has determined that the overall incident management structure for all 
responses is ICS.390 To honor their commitment, responders should actively and 
aggressively seek to understand this system; “NIMS stakeholders share responsibility for 
ensuring the success of the national NIMS training program.”391 This includes training to 
help responders understand how they fit into the ICS system, not simply to achieve a 
certificate and NIMS compliance on paper.392 This may also include a need for humility, 
and for understanding when to call in additional help.393 It may require the significant 
time and commitment of advanced-level ICS training and certification. There is validity 
to the argument that NIMS/ICS must continue to recognize and maintain its flexibility to 
be considered a viable tool for all-discipline and all-hazard responses. However, 
practitioners must understand that the reason the flexibility should remain in the program 
is to give them and their organizations a transition point to incorporate into larger systems 
and responses.   
If FEMA wants to institutionalize the core ICS concepts nationwide, it should 
follow its own advice that: this goal cannot simply be achieved through delivery of 
training only.394 Training must be effective and, to be so, it must incorporate the social 
interaction critical to adult learning and referenced in the ICS training guidance.395 
Currently, the first two ICS classes—the foundational ICS training—offer an online 
learning path that excludes the social interaction critical to the adult learning process. 
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One of the bullets in NIMS training program guidance clearly puts significant onus upon 
the individuals, stating they should be “active, self-directed participants in their own 
learning.”396 However, it also rests a significant portion of the responsibility on FEMA to 
“deliver instruction in a safe, collaborative environment.”397 The current, static online 
courses do not engage peer collaboration.   
This lack of socialization is further problematic as the NIMS training guidance 
suggests the need to “recognize factors that motivate adult learning … design courses and 
adapt instructional style accordingly [and] … provide opportunities to critically reflect 
upon and immediately apply new learning in order to transfer that learning into habitual 
practice.”398 As identified earlier in this thesis, an important component to adult learning 
is social interaction with the instructor and peers in the group. At this time, the social 
environment is not present in the practiced online delivery method. FEMA should give 
serious consideration to reevaluating the delivery methods of these courses. If it is still 
desirable to offer the online format to make distance delivery possible and attainment of 
the training practical for all learners, then the format of these courses must change from 
static delivery methods with a simple test to dynamic environments that still engage live 
instructors and peer interaction. 
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